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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study examines trade creation and trade diversion effects in the EUSAFTA 
using the standard gravity model of bilateral trade flows. The estimation of the gravity 
equation was carried out using the OLS analysis.  In order to ascertain the overall trade 
creation and trade diversion effects explanatory variables such as GDP, distance and 
dummy variables were incorporated into the estimation equation to explain bilateral trade 
flows and exports respectively. The main focus was on the estimation of trade creation 
and trade diversion effects, resulting from participation in selected regional and 
preferential trade agreements like EU, COMESA, SACU and EUSAFTA. Additionally, 
the overall effects of regional and preferential trade agreements are positive and 
significant indicating that trade agreements, induce and generate huge trade volume 
among member countries. The trade creation effects of (SACU) were negative. This 
study demonstrates that participation in Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements 
stimulates trade between member countries. They also stimulate trade with non-member 
countries, perhaps as a result of an income effect. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994 and subsequent creation of the 
World trade organization led to a proliferation of overlapping preferential trade and/or 
integration initiatives in nearly all corners of the globe. A number of countries and South 
Africa have been in a variety of Trade Agreements. The main objective of this study is to 
investigate the effects of Regional Trade Agreements on bilateral and export trade. The 
study focuses on the positive impact on member countries (trade creation) and the 
negative impact on non-member countries (trade diversion).    
Regional Trade Agreements 
 Regional trade agreements involve a group of countries deciding to pursue free 
trade internally, while maintaining tariffs against the rest of the world. Under a customs 
union, the countries involved choose a common external tariff with the rest of the world, 
whereas under a free trade area the countries maintain different tariffs on imports from 
the rest of the world. The analysis of customs union dates back to Viner (1950), who 
introduced the terms “trade creation” versus “trade diversion”. Trade creation refers to a 
situation where two countries within the customs union begin to trade with each other, 
whereas formerly they produced the good in question for themselves. In international 
trade terms it means the countries go from autarky (in this good) to trading with zero 
tariffs, and they both gain. Trade diversion, on the other hand, occurs when two countries 
begin to trade within the union, but one of these countries had formerly imported the 
good from outside the union. The importing country formerly had the same tariffs on all 
other countries, but purchased from outside the union because that was lowest. After the 
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union, the country switches its purchases from the lowest – price to a higher – price 
country, in this case there is negative efficiency effect.  
The possibility of trade diversion identified by Viner (1950) and any changes in 
the terms of trade need to be evaluated empirically before judging actual agreements. 
More generally, the issue of major concern is, whether regional trade agreements help or 
hinder the movement towards global free trade through multilateral negotiations. The 
idea that increasing returns might be a reason for trade between countries was well 
recognized by Bertil Ohlin (1933) and also Frank Graham (1923), and has been the 
motivation for policy actions. When dynamic effects such as the realization of economies 
of scale and increased investment and technology flows are considered, the presumption 
is more likely that the partners will benefit from the union, and that outside world may 
also gain.  
 The European Union is an example of a single market project that has caused 
excitement both within and outside Europe and has had important consequences for 
international trade. Important economic integration is occurring in the African region 
with the implementation of COMESA (Common Market for East and Southern Africa) 
SACU (South Africa Customs Union), Southern Africa Development Community, 
commission for East African Cooperation, Cross-Border initiative and Indian Ocean 
Commission. Many African countries belong to several regional groupings. With 
multiple groupings regulations can conflict, strategies can differ, and political difficulties 
can abound (Sharer, 1999). 
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Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
 In terms of the agreement, each member of the Southern African customs union 
imposes a similar form of import control to that imposed by South Africa and each issues 
import permits where necessary for the import of goods into its territory. An importer 
who is in possession of an import permit for the import of goods into one member state 
may not use that import permit for the importation of goods into another member state. 
Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 COMESA was established in Lusaka on 21 December 1981. The original treaty 
called for the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of customs duties and non-tariff 
barriers. The history of COMESA began in December 1994 when it was formed to 
replace the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which had existed from the earlier days 
of 1981. COMESA (as defined by its Treaty) was established ‘as an organization of free 
independent sovereign states which have agreed to co-operate in developing their natural 
and human resources for the good of all their people’ and as such it has a wide-ranging 
series of objectives which necessarily include in its priorities the promotion of peace and 
security.    
 However, due to COMESA’s economic history and background its main focus is 
on the formation of a large economic and trading unit that is capable of overcoming some 
of the barriers that are faced by individual states. COMESA’s current strategy can thus be 
summed up in the phrase ‘economic prosperity through regional integration’. With its 20 
member states, population of over 374 million and annual import bill of around US$32 
billion COMESA forms a major market place for both internal and external trading. Its 
area is impressive on the map of the African Continent and its achievements to date have 
been significant. 
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European Union (EU) 
 European Union was brought into existence by a series of multilateral treaties 
between sovereign states. The treaty of Rome, which came into force in January 1985, 
established the European Economic Community (EEC) between the original six member 
states, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The treaty of 
the European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty identifies the goal of 
Economic and Monetary Union but also covers areas such as visa policy, industry policy, 
education, culture etc.  
In over fifty years since Jacob Viner’s seminal article on customs unions, a vast 
literature has amassed around the potential effects of preferential free trade agreements 
(PTAs).  Theoretical research in this area has generally suggested that welfare should 
improve for members if more trade is created within the union relative to the trade 
diverted from outside, with the effect on the rest of the world being ambiguous.  
Empirical tests of these hypotheses have generally found positive welfare gains from 
PTAs. However, existing studies may be biased because they do not sufficiently account 
for the general equilibrium implications of PTA formation and spatial correlation among 
bilateral trades across countries.  As shown in this paper, the bias caused by these effects 
is not trivial.  In fact, after correcting for them, the estimates found here suggest that the 
consequences of PTAs are likely to be sizeable.   
 This study focuses on the roles of four PTAs (The EU, COMESA, SACU and 
EU-SOUTH AFRICA FTA) on trade patterns among 38 countries for which data is 
available. The empirical test is designed to address the key question of Trade Creation 
and Trade Diversion effects of the PTAs. 
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Historical Background  
During the crisis years of apartheid, Britain was always more concerned with 
safeguarding its interests in South Africa rather than exerting pressure which the 
existence of those interests gave it, as a lever to alter the conditions that put the interests 
at risk in the first place. After a long battle in the South Africa-Europe negotiations, the 
European Union finally agreed that affirmative action criteria should be allowed to apply 
in tenders for the supply of computers and other equipment for the South African 
parliament: preference would be given to black tenderers or tenderers involved in 
subcontracting or partnership agreements with black entrepreneurs. The European Union, 
the stronger partner in the two-way negotiations, has in its Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) the largest social-political-economic programme in the world. (Bozzoli, 1999 p. 
195-197) 
Agreement appeared to have been reached during February 1999 although full 
details were not made public. The European Union had lowered its exclusion list of South 
African agricultural exports from 46 to 38 per cent so that over ten years the European 
Union was committed to lower tariffs on 62 per cent of South Africa's agricultural 
exports. Free trade was to cover 'substantially all trade' - about 95 per cent - without 
excluding any sector while, in its turn, South Africa agreed to drop tariffs on 81 per cent 
of European Union agricultural imports over 12 years. South Africa would also be able to 
export 60,000 tons of canned fruit at 'favorable conditions' to the European Union and 
about 32 million liters of wine at 50 per cent rebates at the most favored nation rate. 
However, five European countries rejected the deal as too favorable to South Africa. 
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These countries were Spain, Portugal, France, Italy and Greece, each of which is a major 
fruit exporter.  
 Following this offer, South Africa requested and obtained access to GSP 
preferences, and called for a long-term agreement under terms as close as possible to the 
Lomé Convention. The European Union rejected this request and offered in its place a free 
trade agreement and a qualified accession to Lomé (excluding the trade aspects of the 
Convention). The negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement were formally opened in 
June 1995 and were still on going at the time the study was completed (June 1998). 
Problem Statement 
               To seek reasons for the treatment only in trade relations contradicts other South 
African behavior. If trade was that important, why was South Africa consistently 
unenthusiastic about giving favorable trade treatment to European Union, to the extent of 
suppressing the opportunity whenever it was possible? Even during the apartheid era, 
numerous import restrictions were imposed on European products. It was only in 1985 
that the Republic decided to treat The European Union as a most favored nation and 
stopped applying article 35 of the WTO to the already established major trading partner 
(Bell, 2004, 45-49). The EU gives specific reference to internal support and export 
subsidies and improved market access to the main export market could be beneficial for 
the South African agricultural sector. 
    Through the process of gathering information about the Trade creation and trade 
diversion effects in the EU-South Africa FTA, specific characteristics and influences 
have been identified that help to further explain what comprises the total trade effect of a 
free trade agreement. Once identified, the effects of trade creation and trade diversion can 
be quantified to determine the total trade effect on South Africa resulting from the free 
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trade agreement. A successful estimation and quantification of trade creation and trade 
diversion effects can provide assistance to future investigations with respect to free trade 
agreements of this nature. The purpose of this study is to estimate the trade creation and 
trade diversion effects in the EU-South Africa FTA and their participation in other 
Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements using the gravity model of bilateral trade 
flows. 
Justification 
               The effects of trade creation and trade diversion in the bilateral free trade 
agreement are important to study for several reasons. Free trade agreements are very 
important for developing countries especially in a situation of an import-based economy. 
With free trade, trade flows will be smooth for both trading partners and eventually 
improve the welfare and consumption level of the populace at large, depending on the 
total effect. For this reason trade creation and trade diversion effects play an important 
role in identifying trade patterns. 
 In the empirical literature of studies that have been conducted in the area of trade 
creation and trade diversion in various free trade agreements, there has been much 
information and insight added to understand  the  trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of free trade areas. Most of the research that has been published has focused 
largely on the area of Customs Union type of preferential trade agreements. Viner (1950) 
showed that regional trade agreements could be beneficial or harmful to the participating 
countries because the preferential nature of these trade deals generated both trade creation 
and trade diversion effects. The empirical work on the subject has proven to be 
challenging, in that it could not answer “even the most basic issue regarding preferential 
trading agreements: whether trade creation outweighs trade diversion” Clausing (2001, 
 8
p.678). This study deals specifically with FTA between two trading partners EU-South 
Africa. The purpose for choosing the EU and South Africa is to broaden the 
understanding of how countries benefit from free trade even when protectionists are of 
the contrary opinion. 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) were the first authors applying the gravity 
equation to analyze international trade flows. Since then, the gravity model has become a 
popular instrument in empirical foreign trade analysis. The model has been successfully 
applied to flows of varying types such as migration, foreign direct investment and more 
specifically to international trade flows. According to this model, exports from country i 
to country j are explained by their economic sizes (GDP or GNP), their populations, 
direct geographical distances and a set of dummies incorporating some kind of 
institutional characteristics common to specific flows. 
               This study is important because it offers a detailed analysis of the trade creation 
and trade diversion effects in the EU-South Africa FTA using the gravity model of 
bilateral trade to estimate trade flows from South Africa to the EU. This analysis is 
differentiated on the basis of large country versus small country trade partnership and by 
the fact that it will provide estimates of whether trade creation and trade diversion are 
lower among trade partners that sign agreements than among those that decline the 
option. The implications of this study can be far reaching and can project the impact of 
the FTA between South Africa and the EU on the bilateral trade flows between the two. 
Study Objective 
 Free trade agreements have a substantial impact on the participant countries in terms of 
welfare, consumption, production and trade flows. This study will put emphasis on the 
trade creation and trade diversion effects of the EU-South Africa FTA. The main 
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objective of this study is to investigate the trade creation and trade diversion effects in the 
EUSAFTA. The focus area is on their participation in other regional and preferential 
trade Agreements (EU, COMESA, SACU, and EUSAFTA) and the effects of trade 
creation and trade diversion on trade volume. 
 The rest of this work summarizes the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
on trade creation and trade diversion effects in the free trade agreements and a discussion 
of the methods and procedures used which includes the gravity model used in this study. 
The next section presents a discussion of the model, data and variables included in the 
model. In conclusion, there will be a discussion of results. 
Thesis Organization 
 This study is segmented into five chapters. Chapter one comprises of the 
introduction, problem statement, justification, objectives, and estimation techniques. 
Chapter two comprises of theoretical and empirical review of international trade theory to 
support the analytical methods used in this study. Chapter three discusses the 
methodologies employed. Chapter four discusses the data and variables used for the 
analysis, along with the estimated results from the models used for this study.  Chapter 
five includes the summary and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
  When it comes to estimating and analyzing trade creation and trade diversion 
effects in the trade among countries, and between member countries and non-members, 
the theoretical literature showed that the formation of free trade areas, customs unions, or 
other preferential trading blocs had uncertain effects on economic welfare. Viner (1950) 
showed that regional trade agreements could be beneficial or harmful to the participating 
countries because the preferential nature of these trade deals stimulates both trade 
creation and trade diversion. The empirical work on the subject has proven to be 
challenging that it could not answer “even the most basic issue regarding preferential 
trading agreements: whether trade creation outweighs trade diversion” Clausing (2001, 
p.678). 
A Standard Gravity Model 
The first formulations of the gravity equation are found in Timbergen (1962), 
Pöyhönen (1963) and Pulliainen (1963). Linnemann (1966) and many other authors such 
as Aitken (1973) and Leamer (1974) extended its use. According to Deardorff (1984), the 
empirical success of the gravity equation is due to the fact that it can explain some real 
phenomenon the conventional factor endowment theory of international trade cannot: the 
trade between industrialized countries, the intra-industry trade and the lack of dramatic 
reallocations of resources when trade liberalization processes have taken place. 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) were the first authors applying the gravity 
equation to analyze international trade flows. Since then, the gravity model has become 
popular instrument in empirical foreign trade analysis. The model has been successfully 
applied to flows of varying types such as migration, foreign direct investment and more 
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specifically to international trade flows. According to this model, exports from country i 
to country j are explained by their economic sizes (GDP or GNP), their populations, 
direct geographical distances and a set of dummies incorporating some kind of 
institutional characteristics common to specific flows. 
Theoretical support of the research in this field was originally very poor, but since 
the second half of the 1970s several theoretical developments have appeared in support of 
the gravity model. Anderson (1979) made the first formal attempt to derive the gravity 
equation from a model that assumed product differentiation. More recently Deardorff 
(1995) has proven that the gravity equation characterizes many models and can be 
justified from standard trade theories. The differences in these theories help to explain the 
various specifications and some diversity in the results of the empirical applications. 
 More recent discussion by Deardoff (1984), Learmer and Levinohn (1995), and 
Helpman (1999) show that the gravity model has a relatively long history. It differs from 
most other theories (including traditional theory) in that it tries to explain the volume of 
trade and does not focus on the composition of that trade. The model uses an equation 
framework to predict the volume of trade on a bilateral basis between any two countries. 
The particular equation form has some similarity to the law of gravity in physics, which 
has resulted in the term gravity model being applied. These foundations were 
subsequently developed by, among others, Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985), who 
derived gravity models from models of monopolistic competition, and Deardorff (1998), 
who demonstrated that the gravity model can be derived within Ricardian and Heckscher-
Ohlin frameworks. 
Trade patterns have also been investigated using gravity-type equations. The trade 
overlap (i.e. two-way trade within industries) is examined in Bergstrand (1989) and 
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shares rather than trade volumes, which depart slightly from the bulk of work on gravity 
equations. Gravity models have been extensively used to address the issue of the impact 
of trade policies on trade flows like the impact of regional trade agreements. Consider 
that two countries i and j sign a regional agreement. Introduce one dummy: 1 for «both 
in» (i and j in the agreement) and 0 otherwise. If the parameter estimate is positive and 
significant there is trade creation due to regionalism. Bilateral trade flows are considered 
between these countries, in a symmetric manner.  
 The gravity model has been used frequently to analyze bilateral trade flows 
between countries. The equation used is similar in all studies and has the following 
specifications; 
Xij = α0 + α1(Yi) + α2(Yj) + α3(Ni) + α4(Nj) + α5(Dij) + α6(Aij) + α7 (Pij)     (2.1) 
Where Xij irepresents the value of the trade flow from country i to country j; Yi and Yj 
are the values nominal GDP in i and j; Ni and Nj are the size of population in both 
countries; Dij is the physical distance from the economic center of country i to that of 
country j ; Aij represent any other factor affecting trade among i and j either positive or 
negative;  and Pij is trade preferences among the countries.  
 The GDP of the exporting country measures productive capacity, while that of the 
importing country measure, absorptive capacity. These two variables are expected to be 
positively related to trade. Physical distance and country adjacency dummies are proxies 
for transportation costs. The most commonly used of the other variables affecting trade, 
are dummies for the Preference agreement in which countries participate; total population 
of importing and exporting countries as well as their per capita income levels. Population 
is used as measure of country size, and since larger countries have more diversified 
production and tend to be more self sufficient, it is usually expected to be negatively 
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related to trade. As noted by Bergstrand (1989), there is an inconsistency in this 
argument, as larger populations allow for economies of scale, which are translated into 
higher exports.    
          Linnermann (1966), Aitken (1973) and Sapir (1981) used the same general 
specification, but also included exporter and importer populations. Microeconomic 
foundations of this alternative specification are discussed in Bergstrand (1984). 
Bergstrand (1984) addressed the argument by critics that this approach is “loose” and 
does not explain the multiplicative functional form and other issues in developing further 
the microeconomic foundations of the gravity equation.  
   In a study using 1988 data just before the Canada - U.S. FTA was signed, 
McCallum (1995) estimated a gravity model where the dependent variable was exports 
from each Canadian province to other provinces and to U. S. states. Exports depend on  
the province or state GDP’s, hence the estimated regression is  
ln Χ јі = α + β1 ln Υi + β2 ln Υj + Χ δij  + ρ ln dij  (2.2)
 
Where δij irepresents an indicator variable that equals unity for trade between two 
Canadian provinces and zero otherwise and dij is the distance between any two provinces 
or states. The results showed negative relationship between distance and trade. The 
results also show that cross provincial trade was some 22 times larger than cross-border 
trade in 1988 and 15.7 times larger in 1993. 
        Apart from international trade flows, gravity models have achieved empirical 
success in explaining various types of inter-regional and international flows, including 
capital flows and labor migration (Vandekamp 1977). Evenett and Keller (1998) along 
with Deardoff (1988) evaluated the usefulness of gravity models in testing alternative 
theoretical models of trade. Apart from the dummy variables, other exogenous regressors 
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used are dummies for wars, conflicts, natural disasters, etc. Krueger (1999) also includes 
a dummy for remoteness to take into account the fact that some countries are further 
away from most of their trading partners than other countries. 
According to the theorem (Krugman, 1980) with two countries trading, the larger 
market will produce a greater number of products and be a net exporter of the 
differentiated good. Helpman (1987), Wei, (1996), Soloaga and Winters (1999), Limao 
and Venables (1999) and Bougheas et al, (1999) among others, contributed to the 
refinement of the explanatory variables considered in the analysis and to the addition of 
new variables. 
 According to the generalized gravity model of trade, the volume of exports 
between a pair of countries, Xij, is a function of their incomes (GDPs), their populations, 
their geographical distance and a set of dummies. Numerous empirical studies showed 
that trade flows follow the physical principles of gravity: two opposite forces determine 
the volume of bilateral trade between countries - the level of their economic activity and 
income, and the extent of impediments to trade. National borders are among these 
impediments, even for industrialized countries (MaCallum, 1995).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
Economic Theory 
 
 Theoretical studies regarding the microeconomic foundations of the 
gravity equation (Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) and Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, ch. 8) provide rigorous explanations for the log linear form. Mátyás 
(1997) and (1998), Chen and Wall (1999), Breuss and Egger (1999), and Egger (2000) 
improved the econometric specification of the gravity equation. Second, Berstrand 
(1985), Helpman (1987), Wei, (1996), Soloaga and Winters (1999), Limao and Venables 
(1999) and Bougheas et al, (1999) among others, contributed to the refinement of the 
explanatory variables considered in the analysis and to the addition of new variables. 
 According to the generalized gravity model of trade, the volume of exports 
between pairs of countries, Xij, is a function of their incomes (GDPs), their populations, 
their geographical distance and a set of dummies accounting for Regional and 
Preferential trade Agreement membership.  More recently, Deardoff (1984), Learmer and 
Levinohn (1995), and Helpman (1999) show that the gravity model has a relatively long 
history.  It differs from most other theories (including traditional theory) in that it 
explains the volume of trade and does not focus on the composition of that trade. The 
model uses an equation framework to predict the volume of trade on a bilateral basis 
between any two countries.  
 Other variables are often introduced, such as population size in the exporting and 
or importing country (as related to market size or economies of scale) or a variable to 
reflect an economic integration arrangement (such as a free trade area) between the two 
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countries. These foundations were subsequently developed by, Anderson (1979) and 
Bergstrand (1985) among others, who derived gravity models from models of 
monopolistic competition, and Deardorff (1998), who demonstrated that the gravity 
model could be derived within the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin frameworks. 
 Traditionally, the gravity model uses distance to model transportation costs. 
However, Bougheas et al., (1999) showed that transport costs are a function not only of 
distance but also of public infrastructure. They augmented the gravity model by 
introducing additional infrastructure variables (stock of public capital and length of 
motorway network). Their model predicts a positive relationship between the levels of 
infrastructure and the volume of trade, which is supported using data from European 
countries.  They took a further step in this direction by introducing a new infrastructure 
index (taking information on roads, paved roads, railroads and telephones) and 
differentiating between exporter and importer infrastructure as explanatory variables of 
bilateral trade flows. 
 According to Sanso et al., (1989, 155-166) the basic formulation of the gravity 
equation is as follows:  
                                   Mij = A+Yiβ1+Υіβ2+Liβ3+Ljβ4+Dijβ5                                       (3.1)                              
Where Mij   represents the current value of exports from country i to country j, A 
represents constant, Y represents the current value of income, L represents population, 
and Dij   represents distance between countries i and j. 
          One of the characteristics of the equation is its general validity, since it is equally 
applicable to any pair of countries. It is also symmetrical because it provides the trade 
flows in both directions by changing country i variables for country j ones. Other dummy 
variables indicating membership to an economic area or neighborhood, indicators of 
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protection levels, or any relevant variables can be added to the equation. Sanso et al., 
went further to consider the following model to be estimated: 
Mij = Ft +Yit+Yjt+Yjt+ Dij,+EECijt,+EFTAijt+ NEARij   (3.2) 
 
Where Mijt represents the current value of sales from country i to country j in period t,Yit 
represents the current value of country i per capita income in period t,Yjt  represents the 
current value of country j per capita income in period t, Yjt represents current value of 
country j income in period t, Dij represents distance from country i to country j, EECijt 
represents the dummy variable that shows Whether both countries i and j  are integrated 
into the EEC in period t, EFTAijt represents the dummy variable that shows  whether both 
countries i and j are integrated into the EFTA in period t, and NEARij represents the 
dummy variable that shows whether both countries i and j have a common frontier.    
   Using total export and total import, annual data from 1964 to 1987 between each 
pair of countries, GDP and population of every country, distance between countries, and 
dummies of membership in the EEC and EFTA are used to estimate the gravity model in 
log-linear format (Sanso et al., 1989). There are three reasons, which justify the addition 
of these variables to the basic formulation. First, they usually appear in models that use 
the equation with developed countries, as is our case. Second, they are perfectly 
compatible with the spirit inspiring the gravity equation. Finally, the inclusion of EEC 
and EFTA enables us to assess the evolution through time of the evolution of both trade 
agreements. 
There are a large number of empirical applications in the literature of international 
trade, which have contributed to the performance of the gravity equation. Some of them 
are closely related to this study. For nearly thirty years the gravity equation has been 
frequently and successfully used to aid in the understanding of bilateral trade flows 
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across countries as well as to analyze commercial policy measures. The formulation is a 
log linear function upon a set of well-defined variables. The explanatory variables 
include the incomes and populations of both countries and the distance between them. 
Almost all of the empirical works use the log linear form and include these variables, but 
they add others according to their particular circumstances. 
Theoretical Linkages to the Gravity Model 
 
 Economic theory gives several indications as to the factors that affect trade. These 
factors include income, transaction costs and trade agreements. Higher income countries 
trade more; transaction costs and trade agreements are determinants of export potentials 
in the gravity model. Thus various combinations of microeconomic variables, such as 
income and geographic distance, are powerful predictors of trade potentials. Hence, 
gravity equations have been used extensively in the modeling of international trade flow. 
It is common to augment the basic gravity model through additional bilateral variables. 
For instance variables are added to account for common language, common border, 
common colonial history, and common currency. The impact of income and transaction 
costs on trade can also be explained in the partial equilibrium model.   
 Regional trading agreements are generally perceived to be potentially beneficial 
in a trade sense. In the short-run, member countries benefit, as long-run trade diversion 
does not outweigh immediate trade creation effects. Long-run gains occur through the 
channels of increased efficiency through specialization, economies of scale, increased 
trade, and investments. 
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Impact of Income on Trade (Exporting Country) 
Figure 3.1 represents the effects of changes in the income of the exporting country 
in the partial equilibrium model. The free – trade equilibrium is at E, the intersection of 
the exporting country’s excess supply and the importing country’s excess demand. An 
increase in the income of the exporting country shifts the domestic demand curve 
outward from D to D’, indicating an increase in demand and shifting the excess supply in 
the rest of the world upwards from ES to ES’x indicating a decrease in excess supply.  
A decrease in the income of the exporting country shifts the domestic demand 
curve from D to the left D’’ and the excess supply curve shifts downward from ES to 
ES’’x indicating a decrease in excess supply. Greater income in the exporting country 
means a greater capacity to consume and hence decreases its supply exports to the 
importing country. Conversely, lesser income in the exporting country means a lesser 
capacity to consume and hence increase its supply of exports to the importing country. 
The implications of greater income on domestic price are that, will increase from 
Pd to Pd’’. Conversely, the implication of lesser income on domestic price is that there 
will be an increase in domestic price from Pd to Pd’’.  
The implications of greater income on quantity demanded domestically are that, it will 
increase from Qd to Qd’. Conversely, lesser income will lead to a decrease in quantity 
demanded domestically from Qd to Qd’’. 
Impact of Income on Trade (Importing Country) 
 
 Figure 3.2 represents the effects of changes in the income of the importing 
country in the partial equilibrium model. The free – trade equilibrium is at E, as discussed 
in the previous section. An increase in the income of the importing country shifts the 
domestic demand outward from D to D’’. This causes the rest of the world excess 
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demand curve to shift outward from ED to ED’m indicating an increase in demand for 
imports.  
 A decrease in the income of the importing country causes the excess demand 
curve to shift left from ED to ED’’m indicating a decrease in demand for imports. Greater 
income in the importing country indicates greater capacity to demand imports from the 
exporting country, while decreased income has the opposite effect. 
 The implication of greater income on price is that the domestic market price will 
rise from Pd to Pd’.  Conversely, lesser income will lead to a fall in domestic market 
price from Pd to Pd’’. The implication of greater income in the exporting country on 
quantity demanded in the domestic market is that, there will be an increase from Qx to 
Qx’. Conversely, lesser income in the exporting country will lead to a decrease in 
quantity demanded in the domestic market from Qx to Qx’’.  
 The implication of greater income in the importing country is that there will be an 
increase in domestic price from Pm to Pm’. Conversely, lesser income in the importing 
country will lead to a decrease in domestic price from Pm to Pm’’. The implication of 
greater income in the importing country on domestic quantity demanded is an increase 
from Qm to Qm’ indicating an increase in quantity demanded. Lesser income will lead to 
a decrease in quantity demanded domestically from Qm to Qm’’. 
Transaction Costs 
 Figure 3.3 represents the effects of changes in transaction costs on trade. 
Transaction costs include factors related to transportation, handling costs, common 
language and colonial ties. Greater distances between partner countries lead to increased 
transportation costs, which lead to an upward shift of the excess supply curve. These 
changes in transaction costs are seen in Figure 3.3 by a shift in ES. Conversely, lesser 
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distances between partner countries lead to a downward shift in the excess supply. The 
consequence of greater distances (greater transportation costs) is to reduce the volume of 
trade, while lesser distances will enhance trade.  
A decrease in handling costs and potential ease of transportation as a result of 
common borders between partner countries will lead to a downward shift of the excess 
supply curve and an increase in trade between both countries. Another factor that can 
reduce handling costs is common language between trading countries. If trading partners 
speak a common language, there will be a shift of the excess supply to the right, resulting 
in increased trade. 
Colonial ties can be positive or negative depending on the countries involved. 
Colonial ties between Canada and Great Britain as well as the Caribbean and other 
European countries are typically viewed as positive. Contrary to this, the colonial ties 
between Great Britain and countries such as South Africa may result in a less positive 
relationship. Positive colonial ties will lead to increased trade between countries, whereas 
negative colonial ties will lead to decreased trade between countries with such ties. 
Effects of Economic Integration: Trade Creation and Diversion Effects 
 
 Economic integration implies preferential treatment for member countries as 
opposed to nonmember countries. Since this type of arrangement can lead to shifts in the 
pattern of trade between members and nonmembers, the effects must be judged on the 
basis of each individual country.
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Figure 3.1     Impact of Income on Trade (exporting country)
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 While integration represents a movement to free trade on the part of member 
countries, at the same time it can lead to the diversion of trade from lower-cost 
nonmember source (which still faces the external tariffs of the group) to a higher - cost 
member country source (which no longer faces any tariffs). These two effects of 
economic integration are called trade creation and trade diversion. These terms were 
initially used by Jacob Viner (1950), who defined trade creation as taking place whenever 
economic integration leads to a shift in product origin from a domestic producer whose 
resource costs are higher to a member producer whose resource costs are lower. This shift 
represents a movement in the direction of the free- trade allocation of resources and thus 
is presumably beneficial for welfare. Trade diversion takes place whenever there is a shift 
in product origin from a nonmember producer whose resources costs are lower to a 
member country producer whose resources costs are higher. This shift represents a 
movement away from free-trade allocation of resources and could reduce welfare.  
Figure 3.4 and 3.5 represent trade creation and trade diversion effects of a 
Customs Union. Before the economic integration, the price of the good in country A is 
PA ( PB plus the tariff). With integration between A and B, the tariff is removed, and A 
now imports (Q4 – Q1) rather than (Q3 – Q2) from B. Q2 - Q1 of the increased imports 
displace previous home production, and Q4 – Q3 reflect the greater consumption at the 
new price PB facing country A’s consumers. The trade effect is the sum of areas b and d. 
In general trade creation means that a free trade area creates trade that would not have 
existed otherwise. As a result, supply occurs from a more efficient producer of the 
product.  
         Before the union with country B, country A has a tariff on imports of the good. 
Thus country C’s tariff – inclusive price in A’s market is PA = PC (1 + t). Before the 
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union, A imports (Q3 – Q2) from C. When the union is formed with B, country A imports 
(Q4 – Q1), all coming from partner B, which no longer faces a tariff. In general trade 
diversion means that a free trade area diverts trade that existed otherwise. The net trade 
effects for A is the difference between areas b + d (a positive effect due to the lower price 
in A) and area e (a negative effect due to lost tariff revenue by A that is not captured by 
A’s consumers). Producers in the importing country suffer losses as a result of the free 
trade area. The decrease in the price of their product on the domestic market reduces 
producer surplus in the industry. The price decrease also induces a decrease in output of 
existing firms, a decrease in employment, and a decrease in profit. 
 In addition to the trade effects of economic integration, it is likely that the 
economic structure and performance of participating countries may evolve differently 
than if they had not integrated economically. Reducing trade barriers brings about a more 
competitive environment and possibly reduces the degree of monopoly power that was 
present prior to integration. In addition, access to larger union markets may allow 
economies of scale to be realized in certain export goods. These economies of scale may 
result internally to the exporting firm in a participating country as it becomes larger, or 
they may result from a lowering of costs of inputs due to economic changes external to 
the firm. In either case they are triggered by market expansion brought about by 
membership in the union. The realization of economies of scale may also involve 
specialization on particular types of a good, and thus, trade may increasingly become 
intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry trade.  
 It is also possible that integration will stimulate greater investment in the member 
country from both internal and foreign sources. Investment can result from structural 
changes, internal and external economies and geographic markets now open to producers. 
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Furthermore, foreigners may wish to invest in productive capacity in a member country 
in order to avoid being choked out of the union by trade restrictions and a high common 
external tariff. Economic integration at the level of the common market may lead to 
dynamic benefits from increased factor mobility. If both capital and labor have the 
increased ability to move from areas of surplus to areas of scarcity, increased economic 
efficiency and correspondingly higher factor incomes in the integrated area will emerge.  
 The trade creation effect is caused by the extra output produced by the member 
countries. This extra output is generated due to the freeing up of trade between them. 
Increased specialization and economies of scale should increase productive efficiency 
within member countries. The trade diversion effect exists because countries within 
trading blocs, protected by trade barriers, will now find they can produce goods more 
cheaply than countries outside the trade bloc. Production will be diverted away from 
those countries outside the trade bloc that have a natural comparative advantage to those 
within the trading bloc.  
 Preferential trade arrangements are often supported because they represent a 
movement in the direction of free trade. If free trade is economically the most efficient 
policy, it would seem to follow that any movement towards free trade should be 
beneficial in terms of economic efficiency. Whether a preferential trade arrangement 
raises a country's welfare and raises economic efficiency depends on the extent to which 
the arrangement causes trade diversion versus trade creation. The theoretical literature 
showed that the formation of free trade areas, customs unions, or other preferential 
trading blocs had uncertain effects on economic welfare. Viner (1950) showed that 
regional trade agreements could be beneficial or harmful to the participating countries.
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A Standard Gravity Model 
 
Gravity models were first applied to international trade by Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pöyhönen (1963), who proposed that the volume of trade could be estimated as an 
increasing function of the national incomes of the trading partners, and a decreasing 
function of the distance between them. Although the gravity model became popular 
because of its perceived empirical success, it was also criticized because it lacked 
theoretical foundation. 
 The basic assumption of the gravity is that holding every other variable constant, 
particular countries tend to have rich trading partners. Distance has an influence on trade 
flows. Trade becomes cheaper when trading countries are nearby each other. An increase 
in distance decreases trade flows, the more the transportation costs between trading 
partners. There are also economic and political integrations like the EU, COMESA, 
SACU, and EUSAFTA etc that create trade preference in selected countries. Dummy 
variables are usually added to capture participation in Regional and Preferential Trade 
Agreements. Whalley (1998) noted that the benefits from this form of integration might 
be quite large, particularly in small country cases. 
As a result of these factors and various Regional and Preferential Trade 
Agreements between countries and their trading partners, the following specification of 
the gravity model is considered in this study: 
Yi = A + Xi1c1 + Xi2c2 + Di1c3 + Di2c4 + Di3c5 + Di4c6                         (3.3) 
Where Yi represents trade flows (exports or imports) between country 1 and country “i”, 
Xi1 represents the GDP of country “i”, and Xi2 represents the Distance between country 1 
and country “i”. 
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Dummy variable (Dij) indicate to which Regional and Preferential Trade 
Agreement a particular country belongs: Di1 represents 1 – Membership in the EU (EU-
25), Di1 represents 0 – Otherwise, Di2 represents 1 – Member of COMESA (Common 
market for the East and Southern Africa), Di2 represents 0 – Otherwise, Di3 represents 1 – 
Member of SACU (South Africa Customs Union), Di3 represents 0 – Otherwise, Di4 
represents 1 – Member of EUSA (EU – 25 and South Africa), and Xi1 represents 0 – 
Otherwise. 
Based on the gravity equations put forth by Whalley (1998), Sanso et al., (1989) 
above specification of the gravity model (1), the following bilateral trade equations are 
estimated. Four Regional preferential trade agreements as well as one overall Trade 
Creation and Trade Diversion dummies are explained in both equations. 
The (Bilateral Trade Model) is specified as follows: 
LOG (Xij) = a0 + a1LOG (GDPi) + a2LOG (DISTij) + a3 (EUcij)  
             + a4 (EUdij) + a5(COMEScij) + a6(COMESdij) 
                        + a7(SACUcij) + a8(SACUdij) + a9(EUSAcij)  
                        + a10 (EUSAdij) + a11 (PTAcij) + a12(PTAdij) 
                        + a13Σ (Sij)                                   
(3.5)  
 
Where PTAcij represents preference dummy (trade creation), PTAdij represents 
Preference dummy (trade diversion), PTAcij represents 1 – If both countries belong to 
any Preferential Trade Agreement, PTAcij represents 0 – otherwise,  PTAdij represents 1 
– If one of them belong to any Preferential Trade Agreement, PTAdij represents 0 – 
Otherwise,  Σ (Sij) represents other variables that affects trade like History, language, 
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land locked, borders etc., Σ (Sij) represents 1 – Colonial ties, Common language, 
Landlocked, Common borders; and Σ (Sij) = 0 – Otherwise. 
The (Export Model) is specified as follows 
 
     LOG (Xi) = b0 + b1 LOG (GDPj) + b2 LOG (DISTij) + b3 (EUcij)  
 + b4 (EUdij) + b5 (COMEScij) + b6(COMESdij)  
 + b7 (SACUcij) + b8 (SACUdij) + b9(EUSAcij) 
  + b10 (EUSAdij) + b11 (PTAcij) + b12(PTAdij)  
              + b13Σ(Sij)  
  (3.6) 
 
Where, PTAcij represents preference dummy (trade creation), PTAdij represents 
Preference dummy (trade diversion, PTAcij represents 1 – If both countries belong to any 
Preferential Trade Agreement, PTAcij represents 0 – otherwise PTAdij represents 1 – If 
one of them belong to any Preferential Trade Agreement, PTAdij represents 0 – 
Otherwise, Σ (Sij) represents other variables that affects trade like History, language, land 
locked, borders etc., Σ (Sij) represents 1 – Colonial ties, Common language, Landlocked, 
Common borders; and Σ (Sij) represents 0 – Otherwise 
The measure of the geographical distance between countries is defined as the 
distance between capital cities. For neighboring countries this distance is defined as the 
distance between their capital city and geographical center. The relationship between 
trade flows and the various explanatory variables will be estimated by ordinary least - 
squares (OLS) regression methods. The variables are measured in the following units: 
Trade flows (Xij) measured in millions of dollars; GDP measured in millions of dollars; 
Distance equals Thousands of miles; History equals 1 if they have colonial ties and 0 
otherwise, Language represents 1 if they speak a common language and 0 otherwise, 
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Landlocked represents 1 If landlocked and 0 otherwise, Borders represents 1 If they share 
a common border and 0 otherwise. 
Preference dummy PTA, PTAcij equals 1 If both countries are members of any 
and 0 otherwise, PTAdij represents 1 If one of them is a member and 0 otherwise, EUcij 
represents 1 If both countries are members and 0 otherwise, EUdij represents 1 if one of 
them is a member and 0 otherwise, COMESAcij represents 1 If both countries are 
members and 0 otherwise, COMESAdij equals 1 If one of them is a member and 0 
otherwise, SACUcij represents 1 If both countries are members and 0 otherwise, 
SACUdij represents1 If one of them is a member and 0 otherwise, 
 EUSAcij represents 1 If both countries are members and 0 otherwise, and 
 EUSAdij represents 1 if one of them is a member and 0 otherwise 
The basic gravity model has been expanded to include other variables that can 
explain the trade creation and trade diversion effects of Regional Preferential trade 
agreement. The resulting models shown in equations 3.5 and 3.6 represent an expanded 
version of the basic gravity model. These models will be empirically estimated in log-
linear format in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Estimation Techniques 
 
Following the theoretical literature on the use of the gravity trade model, the 
model used in this study will be the log-log form of the gravity equation, using standard 
OLS regression analysis. The current gravity model is an adaptation of the model used by 
some other variables like physical distance (measured as the great circle distance between 
capital cities), common borders, and language. In order to capture the trade effects of 
various PTA’s some interesting variables will be introduced notably dummies for each 
PTA. These dummies are proxies for the two main trade effects – trade creation and 
diversion. The welfare effects associated with trade creation and trade diversion are not 
captured by these dummies, as noted by Viner (1950), the reason being that the 
dependent variable exports from country i to country j measures the bilateral export flows 
as against welfare. These dummies capture changes in volumes of trade among PTA 
members as well as between them and non-members. The efficiency gains or losses 
associated with changes in export volumes are the major factor that links changes in 
export volumes with welfare. 
  The formulation is a log linear function upon a set of well-defined variables. The 
explanatory variables are the incomes and populations of both countries and the distance 
between them. Almost all the empirical works use the log linear form and these variables, 
but they add others according to their particular circumstances.  
The Data 
The data is of 1998 trade data from the IMF direction of trade database. 
The model is estimated for a cross-section dataset of 39 countries comprised of EU-25 
(Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Czechs Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
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France, Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Poland, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Lithuania), 
COMESA member countries that hold 75% of trade share (South Africa, Egypt, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe), SACU member countries (South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), and the United States. 
Information on four Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements used in the 
study was from the WTO database. The data set consists of bilateral trade and 
exports respectively. 
The current GDP is expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) values. PPP 
values are in theory preferable as noted by Sirnivassan (1995); however PPP values are 
subject to significant measurement errors. Yet, the risk of significant alterations of the 
regression estimated is small, as shown by Linnemann (1966) and Frankel (1997). The 
physical distances between countries were calculated using Indo (2005), web based 
calculations of country distance based on the computer program. The information on 
history, languages, landlocked and common border is based on Central Intelligence 
Agency World Fact book. 
The Variables 
 
 A total bilateral trade flow for country pairs and exports in log form is the 
dependent variable for this study. Table 4.1 lists the variables considered in the gravity 
model analysis. The tables include both dependent and independent variables. The 
dependent variables are bilateral trade flows and export respectively. The independent 
variables are bilateral exports, exports from one of the country members, GDP of the 
importing country and distance from the economic centers of country pairs.  
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Table4.1. Gravity model variables 
 
 Symbol                                                     Variable                                                                  Expected Sign    
 
LNXij                                                    The logarithm of bilateral trade flows 
c1LN GDPi                                  The logarithm of GDP for country i        (+)    
c2LNGDPj       The logarithm of GDP for country j                    (+) 
c3 LNdistij       The logarithm of distance between countries       (-) 
c4EUcij                               EU membership trade creating dummy       (+) 
c5EUdij                               EU membership trade diverting dummy               (+/-) 
c6COMEScij                      COMESA membership trade creating dummy      (+) 
c7COMESdij                      COMESA membership trade diverting dummy      (+/-) 
c8SACUcij                         SACU membership trade creating dummy         (+) 
c9SACUdij                         SACU membership trade diverting dummy      (+/-) 
c10EUSAcij                       EUSA membership trade creating dummy      (+) 
c11EUSAdij                       EUSA membership trade diverting dummy      (+/-) 
c12PTAcij                           A trade creating  Preference dummy       (+) 
c13PTAdij                           A trade diverting Preference dummy       (+/-) 
c14HISTORY                             Colonial ties dummy           (-) 
c15LANDLOCKED          Landlocked dummy         (-) 
c16LANGUAGE               Common language dummy        (+) 
c17BORDERS                   Adjacency dummy         (+) 
eij                                       Normal distribution error term 
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  Table 4.2.Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable                                                          Source   
Trade Flows                IMF direction of trade (1998) 
GDP                       World Bank Development Indicator (2004A) 
Distance               Programme developed by John A. Byers 
History               Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
Languages               Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
Landlocked               Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
Borders               Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 
PTAs      World Trade Organization database 
EU      World Trade Organization database 
COMESA     World Trade Organization database 
SACU      World Trade Organization database  
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Results 
 
 The main objective of this study is to estimate the trade creation and trade 
diversion effects in the EU-South Africa bilateral trade agreement using the gravity 
model. This section of the study examines the estimated gravity model. In particular it 
examines whether the factors indicated in the gravity equation make a significant 
contribution to an explanation of the bilateral and export trade. The applied regression 
method used in determining the significance of variables within the model was the 
standard OLS using the SAS.  
 Countries have developed more active foreign trade relations with other countries 
where total GDP is higher. Distance negatively influences trade flows. Nearby country 
partners have developed more active foreign trade relation with each other. Participation 
in the EU, COMESA, SACU, EUSA etc., and influences trade flows and leads to trade 
creation on one hand, and stimulates trade with non-members on the other hand, resulting 
in minimal trade diversion from non-member countries. 
The estimated regression equations are as follows: 
LOG (Bilateral trade) = -7.7551E-12 + 0.7647*LOG (GDP) 
– 1.09*LOG (DIST)  + 3.0*(EUcij) + 0.93*(EUdij) 
 + 3.297*(COMEScij) + 2.462*(COMESdij) – 2.558*(SACUcij) 
–  0.061*(SACUdij)  + 2.31*(EUSAcij + 1.38*(EUSAdij) 
 + 3.85*(PTAcij) + 9.187*(PTAdij) - 0.328*(HISTORY)                                 
+0.279*(LANDLOCKED) + 0.0131*(LANGUAGE)                                        
+ 0.684*(BORDERS) 
(4.1) 
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Where the coefficients represent α 
LOG (EXPORT) = 1.39611E-12 + 0.696*LOG (GDP)  
- 1.131*LOG (DIST) + 2.235*(EUcij) + 0.980*(EUdij)  
+2.551*(COMEScij) +1.723*(COMESdij) - 2.276*(SACUcij) 
 – 0.286*(SACUdij) + 2.199*(EUSAcij) + 1.009*(EUSAdij)  
+ 4.746*(PTAcij)  + 9.7995*(PTAdij) – 0.447*(HISTORY)  
 - .362*(LANDLOCKED) + 0.017*(LANGUAGE) 
 + 0.4694*(BORDERS)   
 
Where the coefficients represent β 
(4.2) 
 
Interpretation of Model Coefficients 
 
 Two models were estimated, one for bilateral trade and the other for exports (See 
tables 4.3 and 4.4). Dummy trap problem was encountered in this study. However, an 
interaction country with respect to the United States was introduced to the model as non-
members so as to nullify the effect. The estimated coefficients on GDP, distance and the 
dummy variables have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero in both 
regressions. The positive and significant coefficients of GDP indicate that richer 
countries usually trade more compared to poor ones.  
All coefficients of variables that make up the bilateral trade had the expected 
signs and were significant at the 10 per cent level except the (SACUdij), which were 
insignificant but had the expected signs. The negative sign of the coefficient also, 
indicate that participation in the integration schemes does not stimulate enough mutual 
trade with member countries. This sign suggests that this economic integration 
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arrangement is not sufficiently strong to influence trade with non-member countries 
positively and significantly. 
Bilateral Trade Model 
 
 Table 4.3 shows the results of the estimations based on bilateral trade between 
countries. The GDP coefficient was positive as expected and statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level as expected. This is as a result of the positive relationship between 
trade and the income of trading countries. The coefficient of distance variable (dist) was 
negative and significant at the 1 per cent level indicating that transportation costs act as a 
constraint to trade. A country faces higher trading costs if the port is not located in the 
economic center. Distance is negatively related to trade.  
The coefficient of the European Union Trade Creation dummy variable (EUCij) 
was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating the trade 
creating effects of participating in a regional trade arrangement. This suggests that 
economic integration scheme is sufficiently deep and strong to influence the mutual trade 
between member countries positively and significantly. The coefficient of the European 
Union Trade Diversion dummy variable (EUDij) was positive and statistically significant 
at the 10 per cent level, suggesting that the trade diverting effects of the EU is minimal 
compared to the trade creation.  
The coefficient of the Common Market for the East and Southern Africa Trade 
Creation dummy variable (COMESACij) was positive and statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level, indicating that participation in the regional trade arrangement influences 
trade flows and leads to trade creation. The coefficient of the Common Market of the East 
and Southern Africa Trade Diversion dummy variable (COMESADij) was positive and 
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statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, this suggests that these arrangements are 
important to these members performance and the impact was so strong that it generated 
trade between these countries and non-member countries resulting from the fact that the 
demand increasing income effect of Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements out - 
weighed trade diversion from non-member countries.  
The coefficient of the Southern African Customs Union Trade Creation dummy 
variable (SACUCij) was negative and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for 
the simple reason that most of the participating countries originated from the Southern 
Africa region. The negative sign of the coefficient also, indicate that participation in the 
integration schemes does not stimulate enough mutual trade with member countries. The 
coefficient of the Southern African Customs Union Trade Diversion dummy variable 
(SACUDij) was negative but not statistically different from zero, suggesting that this 
economic integration arrangement is not sufficiently strong to influence trade with non-
member countries positively and significantly.  The negative signs of the (SACUCij) and 
(SACUDij) coefficients are in line with the hypothesis tested. Although there are other 
factors responsible for the (SACUCij) and (SACUDdij) negative signs. These factors are; 
participation of smaller countries that are very similar, overlapping memberships of other 
regional trade agreements like Comesa, conflicting regulations, different strategy and 
objectives that can result to negative trade creation and trade diversion effects 
The coefficient of the EU-South African Trade Creation dummy variable 
(EUSACij) was positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level resulting from 
the strong trade creating effects of the free trade agreement between the EU and South 
Africa. It indicates that participation in the trade agreement stimulates a high volume of 
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trade between South Africa and the EU. The EU- South African Trade Diversion dummy 
variable (EUSADij) was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
resulting from the strong impact of the trade agreement which gave rise to trade between 
the trading partners and non-member countries. This also, indicates that the overall effect 
of trade agreements is positive but can also lead to stronger trade stimulation with non-
member countries.  
The coefficient of the preference Trade Creation dummy variable (PTAcij) was 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level indicating that participation in 
preferential trade agreements induce trade flows, stimulate mutual trade and leads to 
trade creation. It also suggests that Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements had a 
positive and statistically significant effect on overall trade. The coefficient of the 
preference Trade Diversion dummy variable (PTAdij) was positive and highly significant 
at the 1 per cent level, resulting from the overall effect of preferential trade agreements 
which gave rise to additional trade which did not have enough trade diverting effect with 
non-member countries especially, with the presence of the United States in the trade 
matrix. The demand increasing income effect of regional and preferential trade 
arrangements outweighs any trade diverting effect, which resulted to high volume of 
trade with non-member countries.  
The coefficient of the History dummy variable (history) was negative and 
significant at the 10 per cent level but had the expected signs indicating that common 
colonial links between the Great Britain and South Africa as a result of the apartheid era 
also had a negative impact on trade as expected. The coefficient of the Landlocked 
dummy variable (landlocked) was negative and not significantly different from zero as 
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expected, indicating that inaccessibility to sea or ocean transportation hinders countries 
ability to trade with each other. 
The coefficient of the language dummy variable (language) was positive but not 
significantly different from zero. The sign was as expected because common language 
amongst countries facilitates trade negotiations. Most of the countries considered in the 
study speak English as a common language, which is responsible for the positive sign. 
There is a positive relationship between language and trade. The coefficient of the 
borders dummy variable (borders) was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level indicating that trade tends to increase if countries shared a common land border 
(i.e. there is a positive relationship between the adjacency variable and trade between 
countries). 
The  R2 coefficients for the estimated equation was 0.5725 and is at satisfactory 
levels for cross section analysis, although they are somewhat lower than those obtained in 
other previous gravity equation applications to trade. This indicates that 57 per cent of 
variation in bilateral trade flows is explained by the variables used in the model. The F 
value is 110.06 indicating that all the variables are relevant to the model.  
Export Model 
 
 Table 4.4 shows the results of the estimations based on exports trade from one 
country to the other. The GDP coefficient was positive and statistically significant at the 
1 per cent level as expected. This is as a result of the positive relationship between trade 
and the income of the recipient countries. The coefficient of distance variable (dist) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level significant indicating the trade 
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barrier effects of transportation costs. A country faces higher trading costs if the port is 
not located in the economic center.   
The coefficient of the European Union Trade Creation dummy variable (EUCij) 
was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, indicating the trade 
creation effects of participation in a regional trade arrangement. This suggests that 
economic integration scheme is sufficiently deep and strong to influence the mutual trade 
between member countries positively and significantly. The coefficient of the European 
Union Trade Diversion dummy variable (EUDij) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 10 per cent level, suggesting that the trade diverting effects of the EU is minimal 
compared to the trade creation.  
The coefficient of the Common Market for the East and Southern Africa Trade 
Creation dummy variable (COMESACij) was positive and statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level indicating that participation in the regional trade arrangement enhances 
exports and has the trade creating capabilities. The coefficient of the Common Market for 
the East and Southern Africa Trade Creation dummy variable (COMESADij) was 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, this suggests that these 
arrangements are important to these members performance and the impact was so strong 
that it generated trade between these countries and non-member countries resulting from 
the demand increasing income effect of RPTAs which out-weighs the trade diverting 
effect.  
The coefficient of the Southern African Customs Union Trade Creation dummy 
variable (SACUCij) was negative and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level for 
the simple reason that most of the participating countries originated from the Southern 
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Africa region. The negative sign of the coefficient also, indicate that participation in the 
integration schemes does not stimulate enough mutual trade. The coefficient of the 
Southern African Customs Union Trade Diversion dummy variable (SACUDij) was 
negative but not statistically different from zero, suggesting that this economic 
integration arrangement is not sufficiently strong to influence trade with non-member 
countries significantly. The negative signs of the (SACUCij) and (SACUDij) coefficients 
are in line with the hypothesis tested. Although there are other factors responsible for the 
(SACUCij) and (SACUDij) negative signs. These factors are; participation of smaller 
countries that are very similar, overlapping memberships of other regional trade 
agreements like Comesa, conflicting regulations, different strategy and objectives that 
can result to negative trade creation and trade diversion effects.  
The coefficient of the EU - South African Trade Creation dummy variable 
(EUSACij) was positive and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level resulting from 
the strong trade creating effects of the free trade agreement between the EU and South 
Africa. It indicates that participation in the trade agreement stimulates a high volume of 
trade between South Africa and the EU. The coefficient of the EU - South African Trade 
Diversion dummy variable (EUSADij) was positive and significant at the 5 per cent level, 
resulting from the strong impact of the trade agreement towards generating trade between 
the trading partners and non-member countries. This also, indicates that the overall effect 
of trade agreements is positive but can also lead to stronger trade relations with non-
member countries, which led to minimal trade diverting tendencies.  
The coefficient of the preference Trade Creation dummy variable (PTAcij) was 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level indicating that participation in 
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preferential trade agreements induce trade flows, stimulate mutual trade and leads to 
trade creation. It also suggests that Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements PTAs 
had a positive and statistically significant effect on overall trade. The coefficient of the 
preference Trade Diversion dummy variable (PTAdij) was positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level, resulting from the overall effect of preferential trade 
agreements which gave rise to additional trade which did not have enough trade diverting 
effect with non-member countries especially, with the presence of the U.S in the trade 
matrix. The demand increasing income effect of regional and preferential trade 
arrangements outweighs any trade diverting effect, which resulted to high volume of 
trade with non-member countries.  
The coefficient of the History dummy variable (history) was negative and 
significant at the 1 per cent level, but had the expected signs indicating that common 
colonial ties between the Great Britain and South Africa coupled with apartheid had a 
negative impact on trade as expected. The coefficient of the Land locked dummy variable 
(landlocked) was negative and not significantly different from zero as expected, 
indicating that lack of access to sea or ocean transportation hinders countries ability to 
trade with each other. 
The coefficient of the Language dummy variable (language) was positive but not 
significantly different from zero. The sign was as expected because common language 
amongst countries facilitates trade negotiations. Most of the countries considered in the 
study speak English as a common language which is responsible for the positive sign. 
There is a positive relationship between language and trade. The coefficient of the 
borders dummy variable (borders) was positive and statistically significant at the 5 per 
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cent level indicating that trade tended to increase if countries shared a common land 
border (i.e. there is a positive relationship between the adjacency variable and trade 
between countries). 
The R2 coefficient for the estimated equation was 0.5646. This indicates that 56 
per cent of variation in export trade is explained by the variables used in the model. (The 
explanation for the export trade is the same as in the bilateral trade). The F value is 
106.57 indicating that all the variables are relevant to the model.  
Summary 
 
The gravity model was used to estimate trade creation and trade diversion effects 
in the EU and South Africa bilateral and exports trade.  The results of the regression 
analyses show that the explanatory variables explain more than 57% and 56% of the 
variation in the dependent variables of the standard gravity equation used in this study.   
 The estimates for the entire group of countries confirm the hypothesis put 
forward in the analysis that participation in a Regional Preferential Trade Agreement 
leads to Trade Creation. All the regression coefficients have the expected sign, and most 
including the dummy variables are statistically different from zero. Significant 
coefficients for GDP in the analysis confirm that it has a positive relationship with trade. 
The negative and statistically significant coefficients of the distance variable indicates the 
trade barrier impact of transportation costs,  
  The significant coefficients of the preference dummy variables suggest that this 
economic integration scheme is sufficiently deep to influence the mutual trade between 
member countries. The positive sign of the preference dummy variables indicates that 
participation in trade agreements stimulate mutual trade and lead to trade with other non 
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member nations because the income effect is sufficiently strong to create trade between 
member countries.  
 The significance and size of the coefficients for the preferential trade agreements 
suggest that these arrangements create trade with non-member countries compared to 
diversion. The significance and size of the Trade Creation and Diversion dummy 
coefficients (COMESAcij, COMESAdij, EUSAcij, EUSAdij SACUcij, PTAcij and 
PTAdij), suggest that these arrangements are important to the performance of 
participating countries.  
The coefficients on the history dummy indicate that the impact of the British 
Colonial links was weak as a result of recovery from the negative impact of apartheid era. 
The coefficient of landlocked was negative and not significant. The coefficient on the 
language dummy was positive but not significant. The coefficient on the borders was 
positive and significant. The extent of trade flows can increase if countries share a 
common land border (i.e. there is a positive sign on the adjacent variable).   
The R2 coefficients for the estimated equation were 56% and 57% which were at 
satisfactory levels for cross section analysis, although they were somewhat lower than 
those obtained in some other gravity equation application to international trade.  
Lastly, the overall statistical significance of trade creating and trade diverting 
effects were tested for, as shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. The hypothesis that 
trade creation and trade diversion effects were zero was rejected at all statistical levels. 
The trade creating effects were positive as expected. Furthermore, the trade diverting 
effects were also positive and higher than the trade creating effects.  
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Table 4.3 Gravity Model Estimated Results (Log (Bilateral Trade) as 
dependent Variable)  
Variables Model Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept -7.7551E-12 2.47641 
LNGDP  0.76147* 0.04129 
LNDISTANCE -1.09102* 0.11538 
EUCIJ 3.07695** 0.92809 
EUDIJ 0.92739*** 0.61214 
COMESACIJ  3.29731* 0.68448 
COMESADIJ 2.46171* 0.28370 
SACUCIJ -2.55774* 0.47356 
SACUDIJ -0.06120 0.25682 
EUSACIJ 2.30857* 0.51991 
EUSADIJ 1.38073** 0.48727 
PTACIJ 3.84644*** 2.75702 
PTADIJ 9.18651* 2.72985 
HISTORY 0.0131*** 0.18103 
LANDLOCKED -0.27860 0.26143 
LANGUAGE 0.01317 0.01278 
BORDERS 0.68413** 0.20022 
R-Square 
Number of observations 
F-Value 
(overall) p-Value  
 
  
0.5725 
1331 
106.57 
 <.0001 
*=0.01               
**= 0.05 
***=0.1 
(level of significance) 
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Table 4.4 Gravity Model estimated Results (Log (Exports) as Dependent 
Variable)  
Variables Model Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept 1.39611E-12 2.46066 
LNGDP  0.69616* 0.04102 
LNDISTANCE -1.13124* 0.11465 
EUCIJ 2.23487** 0.11465 
EUDIJ 0.98009*** 0.92020 
COMESACIJ  2.55126* 0.68012 
COMESADIJ 1.72349* 0.28189 
SACUCIJ -2.27579* 0.47055 
SACUDIJ -0.28629 0.25519 
EUSACIJ 2.19948* 0.51660 
EUSADIJ 1.00907** 0.48417 
PTACIJ 4.74552*** 2.73949 
PTADIJ 9.79951* 2.71249 
HISTORY -0.44683* 0.17988 
LANDLOCKED -0.36194 0.25976 
LANGUAGE 0.01740 0.01270 
BORDERS 0.48936** 0.19895 
R-Square 
Number of observations 
F-Value 
(overall) p-Value 
 0.5646 
 1331 
 106.57 
 <.0001 
*=0.01               
**= 0.05 
***=0.1 
(level of significance)          
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CHAPTER 5 
 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
 
 The economic structure and the level of economic development differ between 
these different groupings of countries. The difference in economic structure and 
economic development among these countries may cause the effects of the variables such 
as GDP, distance etc., on trade flows to differ from one group to another.  
 This study has considered trade creation and trade diversion effects of the EU, 
COMESA, SACU and EUSAFTA regional and preferential trade agreements. The 
objective of this study was accomplished using the standard gravity model of 
international trade. Countries have developed more mutual foreign trade relations with 
other countries where GDP is higher. Distance negatively influences trade flows. Nearby 
country pairs have developed more active foreign trade relations with each other. 
Participation in the regional and preferential trade agreements influences trade flows and 
leads to trade creation.  
 The positive and significant GDP coefficients confirm that bilateral and export 
trade is strongly affected by the trading partner’s incomes. The negative but statistically 
significant coefficients of the distance variable indicate the trade barrier impact of 
transportation costs, but the extent of trade flows can increase if the countries share a 
common land border which was positive and statistically different from zero. The 
coefficients on landlocked was negative but not statistically different from zero. History 
coefficient was negative but statistically different from zero. Most preferential trade 
agreement variables were statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels of 
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significance, but SACU trade creating dummy variable coefficients were negative but 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. The overall trade creation 
coefficients were positive and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels of 
significance except for SACU, which was negative but statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
 The overall trade diversion effects were positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level except for SACU, which was negative and insignificant. The creation 
coefficients indicate that preferential trade agreements create trade opportunities for 
member countries.  The positive effects of a trade-diverting dummy suggest that 
additional trade due to preferential trade agreements does not lead to diverting trade with 
non-member countries. Preferential trade agreements most likely stimulate demand for 
imports and supply of exports from non participating countries by increasing countries 
overall income.  
Conclusions 
The overall trade creation and trade diversion effects of (EUSAFTA) along with 
other regional preferential trade arrangements were analyzed for bilateral and export 
trade respectively using the gravity model. The overall effects of regional and preferential 
trade agreements are positive and significant indicating that trade agreements, induce and 
generate trade among member countries. The trade creating effects of (SACU) was 
negative and statistically significant perhaps because these countries operate within the 
same geographical area and have similar economies. 
 Overall trade-diverting effects were positive, suggesting that regional and 
preferential trade agreements do not necessarily divert trade with non-member countries. 
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The rationale for this is that the trade creating impact of regional and preferential trade 
agreements increases overall demand to such an extent that the income effect outweighs 
the trade diverting effect of the agreements. It has been noted that the benefits of regional 
and preferential trade agreements are larger for member countries than for non-member 
countries. Overall, the results suggest that there were significant trade creation and trade 
diversion effects in the European Union and South Africa preferential trade agreement. 
Further Study and Limitations 
 This study showed that trade can be influenced positively when countries 
participate in regional and preferential trade agreements as a result of trade creation 
effects which lead to demand increasing income effects that out-weigh any trade 
diversion effect with non-members. The usefulness of using cross-section data in a 
gravity model to assess the effects of most regional and preferential trade agreement was 
highlighted by this study. Contrary to the use of bilateral trade flows in estimating the 
gravity model, the use of export of one of the trading country pairs was introduced in this 
study. One implication of this study is the positive trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of being a participating country in a regional and preferential trade agreement 
contrary to the notion of negative trade diversion effects.  
 The limitations of the gravity model include the inability of the model to predict 
the welfare effects of Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements. The second limitation 
is the model’s dependence upon aggregated data as opposed to disaggregated data which 
can help in analyzing the effects of trade agreements on specific commodities. 
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APPENDIX 1: PTA MEMBERSHIP 
 
Agreement Full name    Membership     
EU  European Union   Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg 
       France, Germany, Sweden, Greece,  
       Portugal, Spain, Netherlands,  
       Denmark, UK, Italy, Ireland,   
       Finland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,  
       Czech  Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,  
       Malta, Estonia, Bulgaria, Cyprus,  
       Hungary, Poland 
 
COMESA Common market for    Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius 
  the East and Southern Africa     Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia,  
           South Africa 
          
SACU   South African  
  Customs Union   Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
                 Swaziland, South Africa   
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APPENDIX 2: REGIONAL AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
DUMMY VARIABLES  
 
 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
SA Austria 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 czech 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Aus SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Belg SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix A2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Bulg SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Czech SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulgaria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Denm SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1  1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from from EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Eston SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Fran SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Germ SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finla 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from from EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Swed SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finla 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Hung SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Sweden 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Italy SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Nether SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Estonia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
UK SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Pola SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Egypt SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Netrher 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Kenya SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Malaw SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aus 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Mauri SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Zamb SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Gree SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Portu SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Spain SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Cyp SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Latvia SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Malta SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Slovak SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Slove SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aust 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Pola 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Lithu SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Aus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hung 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Irel 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Polan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Botswa SA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Polan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauriu 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Lesotho SA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Aust 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Polan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Namib SA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Aus 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Polan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Maur 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Lesoth 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
Swazil SA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Aus 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Polan 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Lesoth 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Namibi
a 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to 
EUcij EUdij 
COME
Scij 
COME
Sdij 
SACUci
j 
SACUdi
j 
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij 
USA SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 Aus 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Belg 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Bulg 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Czech 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Denm 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Eston 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Finl 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Fran 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Germ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Swed 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Hung 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Irel 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Italy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Nether 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 UK 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Polan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Egypt 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 Keny 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 Malaw 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Mauri 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Zamb 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Zimbab 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Gree 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Portu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Spain 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Cyp 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Latvia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Malta 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Slovak 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Slove 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Lithu 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 Bots 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Lesoth 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Namibi
a 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 Swazi 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 interact 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Continued from appendix 2 
 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Ire SA 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Belg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bulg 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Czech 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Denm 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Eston 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Finl 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Fran 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Germ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Swed 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Hunga 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Italy 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Nether 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 UK 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Poland 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Egypt 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Keny 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malaw 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Mauri 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zamb 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Zimbab 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Gree 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Portu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Cyp 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Latvia 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slovak 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Slove 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Lithu 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Bots 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Lesot 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Namib 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Swazi 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 USA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Continued from appendix 2 
from to EUcij EUdij COMEScij COMESdij SACUcij SACUdij
EU-
SAcij 
EU-
SAdij PTAcij PTAdij
Zimbab SA 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Aus 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Belg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Bulg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Czech 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Denm 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Eston 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Finl 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Fran 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Germ 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Swed 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Hung 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Irel 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Italy 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Nether 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 UK 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Poland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Egypt 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Keny 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Malaw 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Mauri 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Zamb 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Gree 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Portu 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Cyp 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slovak 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Slove 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Lithu 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 
 Bots 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Lesot 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Namib 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 Swazi 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
 USA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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APPENDIX 3: NON TRADE AGREEMENT VARIABLES 
 
from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
SA Austria 177 290.1 5166 0 0 0 0
Belg 1309 349.8 5491 0 0 0 0
Bulg 12 24.1 4746 0 0 0 0
czech 25 107 5310 0 0 0 0
Denm 205 243 5708 0 0 0 0
Eston 13 10.8 5894 0 0 0 0
Finl 238 186.6 5945 0 0 0 0
Fran 1449 2000 5397 0 0 0 0
Germ 5167 2700 5485 0 0 0 0
Swed 348 346.4 5916 0 0 0 0
Hung 24 99.7 5091 0 0 0 0
Irel 358 183.6 5848 1 0 0 0
Italy 2277 1000.7 4779 1 0 0 0
Nether 1609 577.3 5579 0 0 0 0
UK 6427 2000.1 5609 0 0 0 0
Poland 52 241.8 5434 0 0 0 0
Egypt 76 75.1 3866 0 0 0 0
Keny 373 15.6 1809 0 0 0 0
Malaw 341 1.8 919 1 0 0 0
Mauri 242 6.1 1930 1 0 0 0
Zamb 527 5.4 744 1 0 0 0
Zimbab 1669 7.2 606 1 0 0 1
Gree 67 203.4 4421 1 0 0 1
Portu 181 168.3 5061 0 0 0 0
Spain 977 991.4 5010 0 0 0 0
Cyp 16 15.4 4229 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.2 13.6 5725 1 0 0 0
Malta 5.4 5.4 5566 0 0 0 0
Slovak 5 41.1 4353 1 0 0 0
Slove 3 32.2 5156 0 0 0 0
Lithu 1.2 22.3 5037 0 0 0 0
Bots 46 8.7 160 0 0 0 0
Lesot 21 1.4 140 1 0 0 0
Namib 18.2 5.5 152 1 0 0 1
Swazi 22 2.4 201 1 0 0 1
USA 5616 12000.2 7960 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Aus SA 349.7 212.8 5166 0 0 0 0
Belg 2545.8 349.8 570 0 0 0 0
Bulg 223.9 24.1 508 0 0 0 1
czech 3162 107 156 0 0 0 0
Denm 885.8 243 545 0 1 0 1
Eston 35.4 10.8 846 0 0 0 1
Finl 741.3 186.6 842 0 0 0 0
Fran 5425.6 2000 645 0 0 0 0
Germ 47002 2700 326 0 0 0 1
Swed 1591.2 346.4 775 0 0 1 1
Hung 4866 99.7 145 0 0 0 0
Irel 420.7 183.6 1048 0 1 0 1
Italy 10185.4 1000.7 145 0 0 0 0
Nether 3687 577.3 583 0 0 0 1
UK 4334 2000.1 769 1 0 0 1
Poland 2081.8 241.8 367 0 0 0 0
Egypt 123.5 75.1 1485 0 0 0 1
Keny 13.8 15.6 3623 0 1 0 1
Malaw 4.6 1.8 4413 0 0 0 0
Mauri 7.1 6.1 5372 0 0 0 0
Zamb 4.8 5.4 4437 0 1 0 0
Zimbab 14.9 7.2 4635 0 0 0 0
Gree 398.4 203.4 795 0 1 0 0
Portu 625.7 168.3 1429 0 1 0 0
Spain 184 991.4 1126 1 0 0 0
Cyp 26.7 15.4 1251 0 0 0 0
Latvia 32.4 13.6 685 0 0 0 0
Malta 21 5.4 858 0 0 0 0
Slovak 1453.3 41.1 35 0 0 0 0
Slove 1611.3 32.2 173 0 0 0 0
Lithu 64.7 22.3 590 0 1 0 1
Bots 0.6 8.7 4635 0 0 0 1
Lesot 0.1 1.4 5166 0 0 0 0
Namib 1.4 5.5 5166 0 1 0 0
Swazi 0.3 2.4 5210 0 1 0 0
USA 4526 12000.1 4233 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Belg SA 1307 212.8 5491 0 1 0 0
Aus 2545.8 290.1 570 0 0 0 0
Bulg 135 24.1 1057 0 0 0 0
czech 1037 107 448 0 0 0 1
Denm 1718 243 475 0 0 0 0
Eston 113 10.8 996 0 0 0 1
Finl 1919 186.6 675 0 0 0 1
Fran 47100 2000 165 0 0 0 0
Germ 59194 2700 403 0 0 0 0
Swed 4561 346.4 798 0 0 0 0
Hung 1072 99.7 714 0 0 0 1
Irel 3300 183.6 484 0 0 0 0
Italy 14923 1000.7 735 0 0 0 0
Nether 47464 577.3 514 0 0 0 0
UK 29454 2000.1 199 0 0 0 0
Poland 1762 241.8 727 0 0 1 1
Egypt 374 75.1 2000 0 0 0 0
Keny 94 15.6 4067 0 0 0 0
Malaw 12.4 1.8 4804 1 0 0 1
Mauri 100 6.1 5879 0 0 0 0
Zamb 41 5.4 4784 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 74.9 7.2 4998 0 0 0 0
Gree 1126 203.4 1298 0 0 0 0
Portu 2121 168.3 1064 0 0 0 0
Spain 7575 991.4 5010 0 0 0 0
Cyp 84 15.4 1804 0 0 0 0
Latvia 68 13.6 906 0 0 0 0
Malta 113 5.4 1151 0 0 0 1
Slovak 283 41.1 603 0 0 0 0
Slove 182 32.2 572 0 0 0 0
Lithu 214 22.3 914 0 0 0 0
Bots 20.4 8.7 5362 0 0 0 1
Lesot 44.1 1.4 404 0 0 0 1
Namib 41.7 5.5 360 0 0 0 0
Swazi 8.7 2.4 5558 0 0 0 0
USA 22515 12000.1 3668 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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Bulg SA 17.1 212.8 4746 0 0 0 0
Austria 152.2 290.1 508 0 0 0 0
Belg 126.6 349.8 1057 0 0 0 0
czech 71 107 662 0 0 0 0
Denm 54.6 243 1022 0 0 0 0
Eston 3.4 10.8 1156 0 0 0 0
Finl 35.6 186.6 1305 0 0 0 0
Fran 257.8 2000 1095 0 0 0 0
Germ 888 2700 821 0 0 0 0
Swed 60 346.4 1174 0 0 0 0
Hung 57.5 99.7 382 0 0 0 0
Irel 9.1 183.6 1541 0 0 0 0
Italy 71 1000.7 522 0 0 0 0
Nether 146.7 577.3 1095 0 0 0 0
UK 219.9 2000.1 1254 0 0 0 0
Poland 71.3 241.8 690 0 0 0 0
Egypt 45.8 75.1 981 0 0 0 0
Keny 54.6 15.6 3143 0 0 0 0
Malaw 2.13 1.8 3957 0 0 0 0
Mauri 1 6.1 4865 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.03 5.4 4007 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 6.4 7.2 4194 0 0 0 0
Gree 569.7 203.4 324 0 0 0 0
Portu 27.6 168.3 1714 0 0 0 0
Spain 141.8 991.4 1249 0 0 0 0
Cyp 34.5 15.4 747 0 0 0 0
Latvia 3.4 13.6 984 0 0 0 1
Malta 17.6 5.4 669 0 0 0 0
Slovak 29.9 41.1 481 0 0 0 0
Slove 16.1 32.2 493 0 0 0 0
Lithu 35.6 22.3 832 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.03 8.7 4639 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.002 1.4 4746 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.01 5.5 4746 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.001 2.4 4775 0 0 0 0
USA 289 12000.2 4724 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Bulg SA 17.1 212.8 4746 0 0 0 0
Austria 152.2 290.1 508 0 0 0 0
Belg 126.6 349.8 1057 0 0 0 0
czech 71 107 662 0 0 0 0
Denm 54.6 243 1022 0 0 0 0
Eston 3.4 10.8 1156 0 0 0 0
Finl 35.6 186.6 1305 0 0 0 0
Fran 257.8 2000 1095 0 0 0 0
Germ 888 2700 821 0 0 0 0
Swed 60 346.4 1174 0 0 0 0
Hung 57.5 99.7 382 0 0 0 0
Irel 9.1 183.6 1541 0 0 0 0
Italy 71 1000.7 522 0 0 0 0
Nether 146.7 577.3 1095 0 0 0 0
UK 219.9 2000.1 1254 0 0 0 0
Poland 71.3 241.8 690 0 0 0 0
Egypt 45.8 75.1 981 0 0 0 0
Keny 54.6 15.6 3143 0 0 0 0
Malaw 2.13 1.8 3957 0 0 0 0
Mauri 1 6.1 4865 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.03 5.4 4007 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 6.4 7.2 4194 0 0 0 0
Gree 569.7 203.4 324 0 0 0 0
Portu 27.6 168.3 1714 0 0 0 0
Spain 141.8 991.4 1249 0 0 0 0
Cyp 34.5 15.4 747 0 0 0 0
Latvia 3.4 13.6 984 0 0 0 1
Malta 17.6 5.4 669 0 0 0 0
Slovak 29.9 41.1 481 0 0 0 0
Slove 16.1 32.2 493 0 0 0 0
Lithu 35.6 22.3 832 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.03 8.7 4639 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.002 1.4 4746 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.01 5.5 4746 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.001 2.4 4775 0 0 0 0
USA 289 12000.2 4724 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Czech SA 594 212.8 5310 0 0 0 0
Austria 967 290.1 156 0 0 0 0
Belg 887 349.8 448 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 66 24.1 662 0 0 0 0
Denm 304 107 398 0 0 0 0
Eston 27 243 764 1 0 0 1
Finl 368 10.8 697 0 0 0 1
Fran 1806 186.6 551 0 0 0 0
Germ 16742 2000 175 0 0 0 1
Swed 569 2700 659 0 0 0 0
Hung 785 346.4 286 0 0 0 0
Irel 174 99.7 914 0 0 0 1
Italy 2289 183.6 574 0 0 0 1
Nether 1131 1000.7 472 0 0 0 0
UK 1911 577.3 644 1 0 0 1
Poland 1221 2000.1 336 0 0 0 0
Egypt 120 31.1 1640 0 0 0 1
Keny 6 75.1 3778 0 0 0 1
Malaw 11.48 15.6 4574 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.28 1.8 5527 0 0 0 1
Zamb 0.77 6.1 4583 1 0 0 1
Zimbab 18 5.4 4783 0 0 0 0
Gree 147 7.2 951 0 0 0 0
Portu 52 203.4 1395 1 0 0 0
Spain 594 168.3 943 0 0 0 0
Cyp 9 991.4 4229 1 1 0 0
Latvia 29.5 15.4 619 1 0 0 0
Malta 4.39 13.6 981 0 0 0 0
Slovak 6370 5.4 181 0 0 0 0
Slove 360 41.1 279 0 0 0 0
Lithu 124 32.2 559 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.3 22.3 5193 0 1 0 0
Lesot 0.02 1.4 5310 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.2 5.5 5310 1 0 0 1
Swazi 0.04 2.4 5357 0 0 0 1
USA 1230 12000.2 4094 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Denm SA 315 212.8 5708 1 0 0 0
Aus 2635 290.1 545 1 0 0 0
Belg 2635 349.8 475 0 1 0 0
Bulg 58 24.1 1022 1 1 0 0
czech 317 107 398 0 0 0 0
Eston 178 243 523 0 0 0 0
Finl 2586 10.8 299 0 0 0 1
Fran 5041 186.6 639 0 0 0 1
Germ 20059 2000 224 0 0 0 0
Swed 11307 2700 5916 0 0 0 1
Hung 198 346.4 643 0 0 0 0
Irel 846 99.7 765 0 0 0 0
Italy 3740 183.6 4779 0 0 0 1
Nether 5662 1000.7 455 0 0 0 0
UK 8049 577.3 5609 0 0 0 0
Poland 1639 2000.1 412 0 0 0 0
Egypt 144 31.1 2002 0 0 0 0
Keny 23 75.1 4160 0 0 0 0
Malaw 7.96 15.6 4957 0 0 0 1
Mauri 10.59 1.8 5874 0 0 0 0
Zamb 6.28 6.1 4980 0 0 0 1
Zimbab 31.42 5.4 5180 0 0 0 1
Gree 468 7.2 1330 0 0 0 0
Portu 678 203.4 1539 0 0 0 0
Spain 1560 168.3 5010 0 0 0 0
Cyp 27 991.4 4229 0 0 0 0
Latvia 187 15.4 455 0 0 0 0
Malta 46 13.6 5566 0 0 0 0
Slovak 69 5.4 4353 0 0 0 0
Slove 106 41.1 5156 0 0 0 0
Lithu 362 32.2 513 0 0 0 0
Bots 1.32 22.3 5591 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.07 1.4 5708 0 0 0 0
Namib 2.36 5.5 5708 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.89 2.4 5754 0 0 0 0
USA 3983 12000.2 3850 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
eston SA 1.9 212.8 5945 0 0 0 0
Austria 37.4 290.1 842 0 0 0 0
Belg 113.5 349.8 996 0 0 0 0
Bulg 3.7 24.1 1156 0 0 0 0
Czech 31.7 107 764 0 0 0 0
Denmark 182 243 523 1 0 0 0
Finl 1730.7 186.6 493 0 0 0 0
Fran 108.3 2000 1158 0 0 0 0
Germ 655 2700 650 0 0 0 0
Swed 893.8 346.4 238 0 0 0 0
Hung 16.2 99.7 931 0 0 0 1
Irel 20.3 183.6 1245 0 0 0 1
Italy 129.9 1000.7 1252 0 0 0 0
Nether 178.6 577.3 978 1 0 0 0
UK 345.1 2000.1 1111 0 0 0 0
Poland 82.1 241.8 493 0 0 0 0
Egypt 4.4 75.1 2054 1 0 0 0
Keny 2.1 15.6 4234 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.03 1.8 5252 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.08 6.1 6133 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.04 5.4 5278 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 0.17 7.2 5477 0 0 0 1
Gree 6 203.4 1619 0 0 0 0
Portu 7.6 168.3 2060 0 0 0 0
Spain 48 991.4 1651 0 0 0 0
Cyp 0.4 15.4 1720 0 0 0 0
Latvia 224.7 13.6 528 0 0 0 0
Malta 2 5.4 1671 0 0 0 0
Slovak 9.1 41.1 838 0 0 0 0
Slove 3 32.2 1016 0 0 0 0
Lithu 212 22.3 328 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.19 8.7 5790 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.15 1.4 5945 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.11 5.5 5945 1 0 0 1
Swazi 0.13 2.4 5915 0 0 0 0
USA 134 12000.2 4145 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Swed SA 452 212.8 5916 1 0 0 0
Austria 1690 290.1 775 0 0 0 0
Belg 5685 349.8 798 1 0 0 1
Bulg 61 24.1 1174 1 0 0 1
Czech 590 107 659 1 0 0 1
Denm 9777 243 327 0 0 0 0
Estonia 898 10.8 238 0 0 0 0
Finla 7814 186.6 259 0 0 0 0
Fran 7530 2000 963 0 0 0 0
Germ 21223 2700 508 0 0 0 0
Hung 448 99.7 828 0 0 0 0
Irel 1270 183.6 1010 0 0 0 0
Italy 4600 1000.7 1233 0 0 0 0
Nether 9601 577.3 773 0 0 0 0
UK 13945 2000.1 892 0 0 0 0
Poland 1949 241.8 485 0 0 0 0
Egypt 559 75.1 2123 0 0 0 0
Keny 56 15.6 4303 0 0 1 1
Malaw 1.5 1.8 5130 0 0 0 0
Mauri 11 6.1 5938 0 0 0 0
Zamb 7 5.4 5179 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 20.8 7.2 5369 0 0 0 0
Gree 537 203.4 1497 0 0 0 0
Portu 842 168.3 1860 0 0 0 0
Spain 2640 991.4 1473 0 0 0 0
Cyp 55 15.4 1812 0 0 0 0
Latvia 662 13.6 279 0 0 0 0
Malta 37 5.4 1632 0 0 0 0
Slovak 140 41.1 778 0 0 0 0
Slove 167 32.2 933 0 0 0 0
Lithu 269 22.3 426 0 0 0 0
Bots 34.1 8.7 5805 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.4 1.4 5916 0 0 0 0
Namib 1.6 5.5 5916 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.9 2.4 5949 0 0 0 0
USA 10847 12000.2 3934 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
 104
from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Hung SA 37.5 212.8 5091 0 0 0 0
Aus 4430 290.1 145 0 0 0 0
Belg 988 349.8 714 0 0 0 0
Bulg 69 24.1 382 0 0 0 0
czech 831.3 107 286 0 0 0 0
Denm 200.1 243 643 0 0 0 0
Eston 2.3 10.8 859 0 0 0 0
Finl 319.2 186.6 931 0 0 0 0
Fran 1561 2000 787 0 0 0 0
Germ 128871 2700 439 0 0 0 0
Sweden 408.6 346.4 828 0 0 0 0
Irel 141.31 183.6 1192 0 0 0 0
Italy 2736.8 1000.7 504 0 1 0 1
Nether 1084.9 1000.7 745 0 0 0 0
UK 1305.5 2000.1 913 0 0 0 0
Poland 8957 241.8 365 1 1 0 1
Egypt 53.6 75.1 1363 0 0 0 0
Keny 2.47 15.6 3515 1 0 0 0
Malaw 10.73 1.8 4321 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.49 6.1 5246 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.23 5.4 4357 1 0 0 1
Zimbab 13.96 7.2 4551 0 0 0 0
Gree 130.1 203.4 688 0 0 0 0
Portu 89.71 168.3 1545 0 0 0 1
Spain 559.2 991.4 1075 0 0 0 0
Cyp 103.9 15.4 1115 0 0 0 0
Latvia 25.4 13.6 689 1 0 0 1
Malta 680.3 5.4 835 0 1 0 0
Slovak 669.7 41.1 111 0 0 0 0
Slove 400.4 32.2 244 0 0 0 0
Lithu 67.6 22.3 566 0 1 0 0
Bots 0.3 8.7 4979 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.2 1.4 5091 0 1 0 0
Namib 0.1 5.5 5091 0 1 0 1
Swazi 0.1 2.4 5129 0 0 0 1
USA 1594 12000.2 4376 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Italy SA 3899 212.8 4779 0 0 0 0
Austria 10173 290.1 145 0 0 0 0
Belg 16215 349.8 735 1 0 0 0
Bulg 982 24.1 522 0 0 0 0
Czech 2367 107 574 1 0 1 0
Denm 3719 243 957 0 0 0 0
Eston 2306 10.8 1320 0 0 0 0
Finl 2445 186.6 1252 0 0 0 0
Fran 56486 2000 694 1 0 1 0
Germ 76394 2700 327 1 0 1 0
Swed 5273 346.4 1233 0 0 1 0
Hung 2969 99.7 504 1 0 1 0
Irel 2954 183.6 1182 1 0 0 0
Nether 19594 577.3 810 1 0 0 0
UK 30864 2000.1 897 0 0 0 0
Poland 5258 241.8 839 0 0 0 1
Egypt 2306 75.1 1323 0 0 0 0
Keny 158 15.6 3333 0 0 0 1
Malaw 4.7 1.8 4073 0 0 0 0
Mauri 123.9 6.1 5165 0 0 0 0
Zamb 16 5.4 4063 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 215.7 7.2 4273 0 0 0 0
Gree 5971 203.4 646 0 0 0 0
Portu 4113 168.3 1164 0 0 0 0
Spain 22173 991.4 855 0 0 0 0
Cyp 348 15.4 1208 1 0 0 0
Latvia 124 13.6 1160 0 0 0 0
Malta 847 5.4 426 0 0 0 0
Slovak 1261 41.1 486 0 0 0 0
Slove 3191 32.2 304 0 0 0 0
Lithu 273 22.3 1058 1 0 0 0
Bots 10.9 8.7 4656 1 0 0 0
Lesot 1.1 1.4 4779 1 0 0 0
Namib 33.4 5.5 4779 1 0 0 0
Swazi 5.6 2.4 4838 1 0 0 0
USA 29166 12000.2 4298 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
 106
from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Nether SA 1551 212.8 5579 0 0 0 0
Aus 3655 290.1 583 0 0 0 0
Belg 43015 349.8 514 0 0 0 1
Bulg 146 24.1 1095 1 0 0 0
Czech 1051 107 472 1 0 0 0
Denm 5565 243 455 0 0 0 0
Estonia 314 10.8 978 0 0 0 1
Finl 2851 186.6 638 0 0 0 1
Fran 26157 2000 198 0 0 0 0
Germ 72998 2700 408 1 0 0 0
Swed 9607 346.4 773 0 0 0 0
Hung 1089 99.7 745 0 0 0 0
Irel 5125 183.6 448 1 0 0 0
Italy 19109 1000.7 810 0 0 0 0
UK 30848 2000.1 173 1 0 0 0
Poland 2370 241.8 734 0 0 0 1
Egypt 613 75.1 2043 0 0 1 1
Keny 253 15.6 4116 0 0 0 0
Malaw 40.2 1.8 4855 0 0 0 1
Mauri 53.1 6.1 5924 0 0 0 1
Zamb 18.6 5.4 4835 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 126 7.2 5049 0 0 0 0
Gree 1482 203.4 702 0 0 0 1
Portu 2289 168.3 1087 0 0 0 1
Spain 8593 991.4 1970 0 0 0 0
Cyp 75 15.4 1842 0 0 0 0
Latvia 137 13.6 1893 0 0 0 0
Malta 102 5.4 1055 0 0 0 0
Slovak 343 41.1 1460 0 0 0 0
Slove 195 32.2 1430 0 0 0 1
Lithu 228 22.3 1729 0 0 0 1
Bots 6.6 8.7 5413 0 0 0 0
Lesot 1.5 1.4 5579 0 0 0 0
Namib 10.3 5.5 5579 0 0 0 0
Swazi 4.3 2.4 5609 0 0 0 0
USA 27505 12000.2 3652 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
UK SA 4973 212.8 5609 0 0 0 0
Aus 3513 290.1 769 1 0 0 0
Belg 25445 349.8 199 0 0 0 0
Bulg 272 24.1 1254 0 0 0 0
Czech 1981 107 644 0 0 0 0
Denm 6266 243 592 0 0 0 0
Eston 357 10.8 1111 0 0 0 0
Finl 6132 186.6 718 0 0 0 0
Fran 50399 2000 213 0 0 0 0
Germ 3417 2700 577 0 0 0 0
Swed 13112 346.4 892 0 0 0 0
Hung 1509 99.7 913 0 0 0 0
Irel 24366 183.6 291 0 0 0 0
Italy 26127 1000.7 897 0 0 0 0
Nether 38415 577.3 173 0 0 0 0
Poland 3240 241.8 904 0 0 1 0
Egypt 1355 75.1 2187 0 0 0 0
Keny 698 15.6 4228 0 0 0 0
Malaw 52 1.8 4947 0 0 0 0
Mauri 668.5 6.1 6058 0 0 0 0
Zamb 156 5.4 4912 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 369 7.2 3289 0 0 0 0
Gree 2092 203.4 5515 0 0 0 0
Portu 5092 168.3 985 0 0 0 0
Spain 17354 991.4 681 0 0 0 0
Cyp 637 15.4 2000 0 0 0 0
Latvia 711 13.6 4074 0 0 0 0
Malta 546 5.4 1298 0 0 0 1
Slovak 305 41.1 802 0 0 0 0
Slove 433 32.2 1044 0 0 0 0
Lithu 416 22.3 1075 0 0 0 0
Bots 209 8.7 5476 0 0 0 0
Lesot 8.1 1.4 5609 0 0 0 0
Namib 35.9 5.5 5609 0 0 1 0
Swazi 48.2 2.4 5684 0 0 0 0
USA 69991 12000.2 3470 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Pola SA 65.88 212.8 5434 0 0 1 0
Aus 2137 290.1 363 0 0 1 0
Belg 1810 349.8 727 0 0 0 0
Bulg 70 24.1 690 0 0 0 0
Czech 2198 107 336 0 0 0 0
Denm 1660 243 412 0 0 0 0
Eston 140 10.8 493 0 0 0 0
Finl 1057 186.6 646 0 0 1 0
Fran 20624 2000 859 0 0 0 0
Germ 2025 2700 327 0 0 0 0
Swed 887 346.4 892 0 0 0 0
Hung 303 99.7 365 0 0 1 0
Irel 5492 183.6 1135 0 0 1 0
Italy 2692 1000.7 839 0 0 1 0
Nether 3240 577.3 734 0 0 1 0
UK 3369 2000.1 904 0 0 1 0
Egypt 84 75.1 1643 0 0 0 0
Keny 7.67 15.6 3821 0 0 0 1
Malaw 8.19 1.8 4645 0 0 0 1
Mauri 0.23 6.1 5487 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.89 5.4 4696 1 0 0 1
Zimbab 33.73 7.2 4884 0 0 0 1
Gree 286 203.4 1013 0 0 0 1
Portu 110 168.3 1728 0 0 0 1
Spain 1162 991.4 1279 0 0 0 1
Cyp 5 15.4 1345 1 0 0 1
Latvia 101 13.6 325 0 0 0 0
Malta 7 5.4 1199 1 0 0 1
Slovak 784 41.1 353 0 0 0 0
Slove 224 32.2 540 0 0 0 0
Lithu 424 22.3 227 0 0 0 1
Bots 2621 8.7 5325 0 0 0 0
Lesot 2404 1.4 5434 0 0 0 1
Namib 1074 5.5 5434 0 0 0 0
Swazi 1231 2.4 5465 0 0 0 0
USA 1915 12000.2 4261 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Egypt SA 79.5 212.8 3866 0 0 0 0
Aust 133.4 290.1 1485 0 0 0 0
Belg 393.1 349.8 2000 0 0 0 0
Bulg 49.5 24.1 981 0 0 0 0
Czech 130.2 107 1640 0 0 0 0
Denm 157.2 243 2002 0 0 0 0
Eston 4.7 10.8 374 0 0 0 0
Finl 198.3 186.6 2279 1 0 0 1
Fran 1774 2000 2001 0 0 0 0
Germ 23191 2700 1802 1 0 0 1
Swed 5617 346.4 2123 1 0 0 1
Hung 56.7 99.7 5246 1 0 0 1
Irel 167.2 183.6 2478 0 0 0 0
Italy 2369.2 1000.7 1323 0 0 0 0
Netrher 647.4 577.3 2043 0 0 0 0
UK 1387.6 2000.1 2187 0 0 0 0
Poland 911 241.8 1643 0 0 0 0
Keny 105.7 15.6 2182 0 0 0 0
Malaw 12.7 1.8 3029 0 1 0 1
Mauri 0.9 6.1 3888 1 0 0 1
Zamb 6.1 5.4 3122 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 15.01 7.2 3289 0 0 0 1
Gree 269.9 203.4 4587 0 0 0 1
Portu 157 168.3 5933 0 0 0 0
Spain 510.9 991.4 5688 0 0 0 0
Cyp 50.2 15.4 4145 0 0 0 1
Latvia 4 13.6 5674 0 0 0 1
Malta 5.7 5.4 4795 0 0 0 0
Slovak 22.8 41.1 5347 0 1 0 0
Slove 46.8 32.2 5314 0 0 0 0
Lithu 0.5 22.3 5515 0 0 0 1
Bots 0.07 8.7 3779 0 0 0 1
Lesot 0.02 1.4 3866 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.04 5.5 3866 0 0 0 1
Swazi 0.06 2.4 3872 0 0 0 0
USA 4535 12000.2 5621 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Kenya SA 407.606 212.8 1809 0 1 0 0
Aust 14.1 290.1 3623 0 0 0 0
Belg 98.6 349.8 4067 0 1 0 0
Bulg 1.4 24.1 3143 0 1 0 0
Czech 1.4 107 3778 0 0 0 0
Denm 25.1 243 4160 0 0 0 0
Eston 0.04 10.8 4234 0 0 0 1
Finl 43.3 186.6 4447 0 0 0 0
Fran 23191 2000 4020 0 0 0 0
Germ 5617 2700 3949 0 0 0 0
Swed 56.7 346.4 4303 0 1 0 0
Hung 167.2 99.7 3518 0 0 0 0
Irel 23692 183.6 4507 0 0 0 0
Italy 647.4 1000.7 3333 0 1 0 0
Nether 13876 577.3 4116 0 1 0 0
UK 911 2000.1 4228 0 0 0 0
Poland 7.3 241.8 3821 0 1 0 0
Egypt 1057 75.1 2182 0 1 0 0
Malaw 12.75 1.8 897 1 0 0 0
Mauri 27.7 6.1 1930 0 0 0 0
Zamb 6.1 5.4 1122 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 15.01 7.2 1203 0 0 0 0
Gree 8.6 203.4 2831 0 0 0 0
Portu 157 168.3 4007 0 0 0 0
Spain 67.8 991.4 3788 0 0 0 0
Cyp 1.4 15.4 2516 0 0 0 0
Latvia 4 13.6 4074 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.2 5.4 2933 0 0 0 0
Slovak 22.8 41.1 3604 0 0 0 0
Slove 46.8 32.2 3531 0 0 0 0
Lithu 0.5 22.3 3910 1 0 0 0
Bots 1.435 8.7 1765 1 0 0 0
Lesot 0.004 1.4 1809 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.025 5.5 1809 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.2 2.4 1762 0 0 0 0
USA 346 12000.2 7360 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Malaw SA 407.606 212.8 919 1 0 0 1
Aus 14.1 290.1 4413 1 0 0 0
Belg 98.6 349.8 4804 1 0 0 0
Bulg 1.4 24.1 3957 1 0 0 0
Czech 6.5 107 4574 1 0 0 0
Denm 25.1 243 4957 0 0 0 0
Eston 1.21 10.8 5081 0 0 0 0
Finl 43.3 186.6 5252 0 0 0 0
Fran 202.9 2000 4734 1 0 0 0
Germ 82.63 2700 4738 0 0 0 0
Swed 54.4 346.4 5130 1 0 0 0
Hung 2.6 99.7 4321 0 0 0 0
Irel 34 183.6 5211 0 0 0 0
Italy 161.8 1000.7 4073 0 0 0 0
Nether 250.3 577.3 4855 1 0 0 0
UK 706.7 2000.1 4947 1 0 0 0
Poland 7.3 241.8 4645 0 0 0 0
Egypt 97.7 75.1 3029 1 0 0 0
Keny 6.58 15.6 897 1 0 1 0
Mauri 27.7 6.1 1640 1 0 1 0
Zamb 5.9 5.4 369 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 31.279 7.2 321 0 0 0 0
Gree 8.6 203.4 4587 0 0 0 0
Portu 22.4 168.3 4561 0 0 0 0
Spain 67.6 991.4 4427 0 0 0 0
Cyp 1.4 15.4 3379 0 0 0 0
Latvia 1.1 13.6 4916 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.2 5.4 3654 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.8 41.1 4398 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.6 32.2 4302 0 0 0 0
Lithu 6.397 22.3 4754 0 0 0 0
Bots 1.435 8.7 896 1 0 1 0
Lesot 0.004 1.4 606 1 0 0 0
Namib 0.025 5.5 606 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.2 2.4 866 0 0 1 0
USA 105.6 12000.2 7769 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Mauri SA 266.1 212.8 1930 0 0 0 0
Aust 7 290.1 5372 1 0 0 1
Belg 99.8 349.8 5879 1 0 0 1
Bulg 0.13 24.1 4865 1 0 0 0
Czech 0.3 107 5527 1 0 1 1
Denm 10.8 243 5874 1 0 1 0
Eston 0.1 10.8 5807 0 0 0 0
Finl 9 186.6 6133 0 0 0 0
Fran 707.7 2000 5859 0 0 0 0
Germ 180.2 2700 5685 1 0 0 0
Swed 10.6 346.4 5938 0 0 0 0
Hung 0.68 99.7 5246 1 0 0 0
Irel 4.9 183.6 6346 0 0 0 0
Italy 3743 1000.7 5165 0 0 0 0
Nether 53 577.3 5924 0 0 0 0
UK 7.45 2000.1 6058 1 0 1 0
Poland 0.2 241.8 5487 1 0 1 0
Egypt 6.58 75.1 3888 0 0 1 0
Keny 29.8 15.6 2182 1 0 1 0
Malaw 11.21 1.8 1640 1 0 0 1
Zamb 13.36 5.4 1955 1 0 0 1
Zimbab 20.207 7.2 1749 0 1 0 0
Gree 5.6 203.4 4587 0 0 0 0
Portu 1.4 168.3 5933 0 0 0 0
Spain 58 991.4 5688 0 1 0 0
Cyp 5.8 15.4 4145 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.3 13.6 5674 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.2 5.4 4795 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.13 41.1 5347 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.05 32.2 5314 0 0 0 0
Lithu 0.23 22.3 5515 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.62 8.7 2048 0 1 0 0
Lesot 0.13 1.4 1930 1 0 0 0
Namib 0.02 5.5 1930 1 0 0 0
Swazi 0.12 2.4 1732 1 0 0 0
USA 285 12000.2 9288 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Zamb SA 37.4 212.8 744 0 0 0 0
Aust 4.5 290.1 4437 0 1 0 0
Belg 37.6 349.8 4784 1 0 0 0
Bulg 2.15 24.1 4007 1 0 0 1
Czech 0.7 107 4583 1 0 0 0
Denm 6.2 243 4980 1 1 0 1
Eston 0.32 10.8 5152 1 1 0 1
Finl 13.9 186.6 5278 0 0 0 0
Fran 87.6 2000 4699 0 0 0 0
Germ 10.6 2700 4758 0 0 0 0
Swed 78.8 346.4 5179 1 0 0 0
Hung 24.3 99.7 4357 0 0 0 0
Irel 4.3 183.6 5163 1 0 0 0
Italy 15.8 1000.7 4063 0 0 0 0
Nether 17.7 577.3 4835 0 0 0 0
UK 143.7 2000.1 4912 0 0 0 0
Poland 1017.5 241.8 4696 1 1 0 1
Egypt 0.2 75.1 3122 1 1 0 0
Keny 5.5 15.6 1122 0 0 0 1
Malaw 12.29 1.8 369 1 1 0 1
Mauri 1.23 6.1 1955 1 0 0 0
Zimbab 38.1 7.2 243 1 0 0 0
Gree 3 203.4 3683 0 0 0 0
Portu 10.6 168.3 4440 0 0 0 0
Spain 12.26 991.4 4351 0 0 0 0
Cyp 0.1 15.4 3486 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.03 13.6 4984 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.1 5.4 3638 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0 41.1 4425 0 0 0 0
Slove 493 32.2 4313 0 0 0 0
Lithu 32 22.3 4824 0 0 0 0
Bots 2.91 8.7 663 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.071 1.4 744 0 0 0 0
Namib 5.267 5.5 744 1 0 0 0
Swazi 7.614 2.4 775 1 0 0 0
USA 86.5 12000.2 7546 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Zimbab SA 1668.7 212.8 606 0 0 0 0
Aus 18.9 290.1 4635 0 0 0 0
Belg 70.4 349.8 4998 0 0 0 0
Bulg 5.8 24.1 4194 1 0 0 0
Czech 19.5 107 4783 1 0 0 0
Denm 43.3 243 5180 1 0 0 0
Eston 3.2 10.8 5332 1 0 0 0
Finl 21.1 186.6 5477 1 0 0 0
Fran 149.6 2000 4918 0 0 0 0
Germ 7.6 2700 4958 0 0 0 0
Swed 20.3 346.4 5369 0 0 0 0
Hung 14.4 99.7 4551 1 0 0 0
Irel 22.6 183.6 5385 0 0 0 0
Italy 250.5 1000.7 4273 1 0 0 0
Nether 117.5 577.3 5049 0 0 0 0
UK 143.7 2000.1 5131 0 0 0 0
Poland 30.8 241.8 4884 0 0 0 0
Egypt 14 75.1 3289 1 0 0 0
Keny 34.9 15.6 1203 1 0 0 0
Malaw 136.6 1.8 321 0 0 0 0
Mauri 27.682 6.1 1749 1 0 0 0
Zamb 149.9 5.4 243 1 0 1 0
Gree 13.6 203.4 3871 1 0 1 1
Portu 0.2 168.3 4677 0 1 0 0
Spain 64.1 991.4 4580 0 0 0 0
Cyp 0.6 15.4 3647 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.2 13.6 5165 0 1 0 0
Malta 0.1 5.4 3849 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.7 41.1 4622 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.8 32.2 4516 0 0 0 0
Lithu 1.04 22.3 5004 0 0 0 0
Bots 263.7 8.7 575 0 0 0 0
Lesot 3.131 1.4 606 0 0 0 0
Namib 56.584 5.5 606 0 1 0 0
Swazi 25.029 2.4 584 1 0 1 0
USA 230 12000.2 7788 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Gree SA 18.9 212.8 4421 0 0 0 0
Aust 70.4 290.1 795 0 0 1 0
Belg 5.8 349.8 1298 0 0 0 0
Bulg 17.8 24.1 324 0 1 0 0
Czech 29.8 107 951 1 0 0 0
Denm 499.6 243 1330 1 0 1 1
Eston 12.4 10.8 1479 1 1 0 1
Finl 91.4 186.6 1619 1 0 0 0
Fran 3023.9 2000 1301 1 1 1 1
Germ 20.3 2700 1119 0 0 0 0
Swed 12.9 346.4 1497 0 0 0 0
Hung 15 99.7 688 0 0 0 0
Irel 200.6 183.6 1777 1 0 0 0
Italy 117.5 1000.7 646 0 0 0 0
Nether 349.5 577.3 1341 1 0 0 0
UK 30.8 2000.1 1486 0 1 0 0
Poland 70.4 241.8 1013 0 0 0 0
Egypt 29 75.1 702 0 0 0 0
Keny 130.9 15.6 2831 1 1 1 1
Malaw 19.169 1.8 3636 1 1 1 0
Mauri 112.2 6.1 4587 0 0 1 1
Zamb 11.2 5.4 3683 1 1 1 1
Zimbab 0.1 7.2 3871 1 0 1 0
Portu 64.1 168.3 1773 1 1 1 1
Spain 0.4 991.4 1337 0 0 0 0
Cyp 0.1 15.4 576 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.1 13.6 1307 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.7 5.4 533 0 1 0 0
Slovak 1.8 41.1 774 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.4 32.2 728 0 0 0 0
Lithu 210.3 22.3 1153 0 0 0 0
Bots 3.023 8.7 4314 0 0 0 0
Lesot 45.517 1.4 4421 0 0 0 0
Namib 14.676 5.5 4421 0 0 0 0
Swazi 9.23 2.4 4452 0 1 0 0
USA 1552 12000.1 5289 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Portu SA 219 212.8 5061 0 0 0 0
Aust 236 290.1 1429 0 0 0 0
Belg 2076 349.8 1064 0 0 1 0
Bulg 30 24.1 1714 0 0 0 0
Czech 50 107 1395 0 1 0 0
Denm 320 243 1539 1 0 0 0
Eston 21 10.8 2060 1 0 1 0
Finl 439 186.6 1703 1 1 0 1
Fran 6877 2000 902 1 0 0 0
Germ 10175 2700 1435 1 1 1 1
Swed 422 346.4 1860 0 0 0 0
Hung 87 99.7 1545 0 0 0 0
Irel 325 183.6 1026 0 0 0 0
Italy 3979 1000.7 1164 1 0 0 0
Nether 2734 577.3 1087 0 0 0 0
UK 5221 2000.1 985 1 0 0 0
Poland 74 241.8 1728 0 1 0 0
Egypt 170 75.1 2364 0 0 0 0
Keny 22.37 15.6 4007 0 0 0 0
Malaw 7.25 1.8 4561 1 1 1 1
Mauri 8.13 6.1 5933 1 1 1 0
Zamb 11.57 5.4 4440 0 0 1 1
Zimbab 12.13 7.2 4677 1 1 1 1
Gree 165 203.4 1773 1 1 1 1
Spain 1352.5 991.4 472 0 0 0 0
Cyp 6 15.4 2337 1 0 0 0
Latvia 1 13.6 1960 0 0 0 0
Malta 4 5.4 1309 0 0 0 0
Slovak 26 41.1 1461 0 0 0 0
Slove 12 32.2 1301 0 0 0 0
Lithu 6.2 22.3 1942 0 0 0 0
Bots 1.04 18.7 4913 0 0 0 0
Lesot 1 1.4 5061 0 0 0 0
Namib 1.01 5.5 5061 0 0 0 0
Swazi 1.2 2.4 5174 0 0 0 0
USA 2149 12000.2 4266 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Spain SA 758 212.8 5010 0 0 0 0
Aus 2149 290.1 1126 0 0 0 0
Belg 7181 349.8 685 1 0 0 0
Bulg 161 24.1 1249 0 0 0 0
Czech 611 107 943 0 0 0 0
Denm 1612 243 1146 0 0 0 0
Eston 46 10.8 1651 0 0 0 0
Finl 1315 186.6 1358 0 0 0 0
Fran 40560 2000 523 0 0 0 0
Germ 87 2700 1007 0 0 0 0
Swed 2473 346.4 1473 0 0 0 0
Hung 650 99.7 1075 0 0 0 0
Irel 1897 183.6 848 0 0 0 0
Italy 21756 1000.7 855 0 0 0 0
Nether 8647 577.3 721 0 0 1 0
UK 18426 2000.1 681 0 0 0 0
Polan 1110 241.8 1279 0 0 0 0
Egypt 492 75.1 1970 0 0 0 0
Keny 66 15.6 3788 0 0 0 0
Malaw 11.41 1.8 4427 0 0 0 0
Mauri 59.14 6.1 5688 0 0 0 0
Zamb 8.47 5.4 4351 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 69.03 7.2 4580 0 0 0 0
Gree 1270 203.4 1337 0 0 0 0
Portu 12736 168.3 472 0 0 0 0
Cyp 186 15.4 1903 0 0 0 0
Latvia 35 13.6 1535 0 0 0 0
Malta 109 5.4 927 0 0 0 0
Slovak 169 41.1 944 0 0 0 0
Slove 247 32.2 833 0 0 0 0
Lithu 114 22.3 1500 0 0 0 0
Bots 1.58 8.7 4879 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.28 1.4 5010 0 0 0 0
Namib 142 5.5 5010 0 0 0 0
Swazi 3.03 2.4 5110 0 0 0 0
USA 10455 12000.2 3591 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Cyp SA 3.503 212.8 4229 0 0 0 0
Aust 24.1 290.1 1251 0 0 0 0
Belg 81.8 349.8 1208 0 0 0 0
Bulg 107.1 24.1 747 0 0 0 0
Czech 10.1 107 1401 0 0 0 0
Denm 34.2 243 1730 0 0 0 0
Eston 0.4 10.8 1720 0 0 0 0
Finl 22.6 186.6 1990 0 0 0 0
Fran 168.7 2000 1834 0 0 0 0
Germ 650 2700 1549 0 0 0 0
Swed 60.7 346.4 1812 0 0 0 0
Hung 10.8 99.7 1115 0 0 0 0
Irel 30.7 183.6 2288 0 0 0 0
Italy 320.2 1000.7 1208 0 0 0 0
Nether 80.2 577.3 1842 0 0 0 1
UK 539.6 2000.1 2000 0 0 0 0
Polan 2.5 241.8 1345 0 0 0 0
Egypt 48.3 75.1 374 0 0 0 0
Keny 1.3 15.6 2516 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.099 1.8 3379 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.278 6.1 4145 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.2 5.4 3486 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 0.483 7.2 3647 0 0 0 0
Gree 354.3 203.4 567 0 0 0 0
Portu 14.9 168.3 2337 0 0 0 0
Spain 102.5 991.4 1903 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.1 13.6 1566 0 0 0 0
Malta 3.2 5.4 1059 0 0 0 0
Slovak 247 41.1 1222 0 0 0 1
Slove 114 32.2 1236 0 0 0 0
Lithu 3 22.3 1402 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.726 8.7 4142 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.014 1.4 4229 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.012 5.5 4229 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.018 2.4 4230 0 0 0 0
USA 261 12000.2 5468 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Latvia SA 0.38 212.8 5725 0 0 0 0
Aust 25.6 290.1 685 0 0 0 0
Belg 66.5 349.8 906 0 0 0 0
Bulg 8 24.1 984 0 0 0 1
Czech 29.5 107 619 0 0 0 0
Denm 151.2 243 455 0 0 0 0
Eston 0.4 10.8 172 0 0 0 0
Finl 265.7 186.6 528 0 0 0 1
Fran 73.1 2000 1062 0 0 0 0
Germ 625.9 2700 528 0 0 0 0
Swed 328.8 346.4 279 0 0 0 0
Hung 20.6 99.7 689 0 0 0 0
Irel 20.1 183.6 1215 0 0 0 0
Italy 91.6 1000.7 1160 0 0 0 0
Nether 133.5 577.3 896 0 0 0 0
UK 320.6 2000.1 1044 0 0 0 0
Polan 99.7 241.8 325 0 0 0 0
Egypt 3.7 75.1 1893 0 0 0 0
Keny 0.278 15.6 4074 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.2 1.8 4916 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.483 6.1 5674 0 0 0 0
Zamb 14.9 5.4 4984 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 0.483 7.2 5165 0 0 0 0
Gree 4 203.4 1307 0 0 0 0
Portu 2 168.3 1960 0 0 0 0
Spain 23.6 991.4 1535 0 0 0 0
Cyp 6 15.4 1566 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.4 5.4 1524 1 0 0 0
Slovak 16.9 41.1 675 0 0 0 0
Slove 5.2 32.2 858 0 0 0 0
Lithu 283.1 22.3 164 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.726 8.7 5620 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.012 1.4 5725 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.01 5.5 5725 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.018 2.4 5748 0 0 0 0
USA 382 12000.2 4210 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Malta SA 4.3 212.8 5566 0 0 0 0
Aus 16.8 290.1 858 0 0 0 0
Belg 95.3 349.8 1151 0 0 0 0
Bulg 2.4 24.1 669 1 0 0 0
Czech 4.8 107 981 1 0 0 0
Denm 23.9 243 1374 0 0 0 0
Eston 2.14 10.8 1692 0 0 0 0
Finl 4.5 186.6 1671 0 0 0 0
Fran 737.4 2000 1088 0 0 0 0
Germ 475 2700 1151 1 0 0 0
Swed 10.1 346.4 1632 1 0 0 0
Hung 5.4 99.7 835 1 0 0 0
Irel 30.1 183.6 1574 1 0 0 0
Italy 609.2 1000.7 426 1 0 0 0
Nether 104.1 577.3 1202 1 0 0 0
UK 510.5 2000.1 1298 0 0 1 0
Polan 7 241.8 1199 0 0 0 0
Egypt 5.6 75.1 1055 0 0 0 0
Keny 0.2 15.6 2933 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.46 1.8 3654 1 0 0 0
Mauri 0.24 6.1 4795 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.02 5.4 3638 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 0.09 7.2 3849 0 0 0 0
Gree 19.9 203.4 533 1 0 0 0
Portu 10.4 168.3 1309 1 0 0 0
Spain 61.2 991.4 927 0 0 0 0
Cyp 2.1 15.4 1059 1 0 0 0
Latvia 1.3 13.6 1524 0 0 0 0
Slovak 2.4 41.1 858 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.7 32.2 703 0 0 0 0
Lithu 1.1 22.3 1399 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.06 8.7 4230 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.02 1.4 5566 1 0 0 0
Namib 0.05 5.5 5566 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.01 2.4 4413 1 0 0 1
USA 346 12000.2 4626 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Slovak SA 5 212.8 4353 0 0 0 0
Aust 1472.03 290.1 35 1 0 0 0
Belg 292.7 349.8 603 0 0 0 0
Bulg 29.98 24.1 481 1 0 0 0
Czech 6258.08 107 181 0 0 0 0
Denm 72.02 243 560 0 0 0 0
Eston 1.45 10.8 838 0 0 0 0
Finl 121.43 186.6 855 0 0 0 0
Fran 797.62 2000 679 1 0 0 0
Germ 5528.68 2700 345 0 0 0 0
Swed 92.9 346.4 778 0 0 0 0
Hung 656.68 99.7 111 0 0 0 0
Irel 31.31 183.6 1081 0 0 0 0
Italy 1273.98 1000.7 486 0 0 0 0
Nether 426.73 577.3 634 0 0 0 0
UK 195.9 2000.1 802 0 0 0 0
polan 622.61 241.8 353 0 0 0 0
Egypt 21.27 75.1 1460 0 0 0 0
Keny 0.82 15.6 3604 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.14 1.8 4398 0 0 0 1
Mauri 0.09 6.1 5347 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.054 5.4 4425 1 0 0 0
Zimbab 0.61 7.2 4622 1 0 0 0
Gree 48.89 203.4 774 1 0 0 0
Portu 19.92 168.3 1461 0 0 0 0
Spain 102.3 991.4 944 0 0 0 0
Cyp 5.57 15.4 1222 0 0 0 1
Latvia 2.4 13.6 675 0 0 0 1
Malta 1.7 5.4 858 0 0 0 0
Slove 0.85 32.2 190 1 0 1 0
Lithu 30.84 22.3 573 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.04 8.7 5041 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.02 1.4 4353 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.015 5.5 4353 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.01 2.4 5198 0 0 0 0
USA 258 12000.2 4233 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Slove SA 11 212.8 5156 0 0 0 0
Aust 1354 290.1 173 0 0 0 0
Belg 246 349.8 572 0 0 0 0
Bulg 28 24.1 493 0 0 0 0
Czech 381 107 279 0 0 0 0
Denm 101 243 674 1 0 1 0
Eston 2.92 10.8 1016 1 0 0 0
Finl 59 186.6 973 1 0 0 0
Fran 1443 2000 602 0 0 1 0
Germ 4398 2700 450 0 0 0 0
Swed 166 346.4 933 0 0 0 0
Hung 413 99.7 244 1 0 0 0
Irel 401.93 183.6 1055 1 0 1 0
Italy 2803 1000.7 304 1 0 0 0
Nether 323 577.3 614 1 0 0 0
UK 391 2000.1 765 1 0 1 0
Pola 213 241.8 540 1 0 1 0
Egypt 45 75.1 1430 0 0 0 0
Keny 0.08 15.6 3531 0 0 0 0
Malaw 1 1.8 4302 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.8 6.1 5314 1 0 0 0
Zamb 0.7 5.4 4313 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 2 7.2 4516 0 0 0 0
Gree 39 203.4 728 0 0 0 0
Portu 24 168.3 1301 0 0 0 0
Spain 252 991.4 833 1 0 1 0
Cyp 4 15.4 1236 1 0 1 0
Latvia 6 13.6 858 0 0 1 0
Malta 2 5.4 703 1 0 1 0
Slovak 159 41.1 190 0 0 0 0
Lithu 15 22.3 762 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.082 8.7 4918 0 1 0 1
Lesot 0.002 1.4 5156 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.021 5.5 5156 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.001 2.4 5088 1 1 0 1
USA 402 12000.2 3591 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Lithu SA 0.08 212.8 5037 1 0 0 0
Aus 66.2 290.1 590 0 0 0 0
Belg 185.6 349.8 914 0 0 0 0
Bulg 11 24.1 832 1 0 0 1
Czech 117.2 107 559 0 0 0 0
Denm 375.6 243 513 1 1 0 1
Eston 291.2 10.8 328 0 0 0 0
Finl 197.7 186.6 655 0 0 0 1
Fran 291.1 2000 1059 0 0 0 0
Germ 413 2700 514 0 0 0 0
Swed 278.3 346.4 426 1 0 0 1
Hung 73.3 99.7 566 0 1 0 0
Irel 20.3 183.6 1276 0 0 0 0
Italy 284.6 1000.7 1058 0 0 0 0
Nether 274.1 577.3 914 0 1 0 0
UK 411.4 2000.1 1075 0 0 0 0
Polan 399.6 241.8 227 0 1 0 0
Egypt 0.8 75.1 1729 0 1 0 0
Keny 0.9 15.6 3910 0 0 0 0
Malaw 1.2 1.8 4754 0 0 0 0
Mauri 2 6.1 5515 0 0 0 0
Zamb 1 5.4 4824 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 24 7.2 5004 1 0 0 0
Gree 5.4 203.4 1153 0 0 0 0
Portu 17 168.3 1942 1 1 0 1
Spain 113.6 991.4 1500 1 0 0 1
Cyp 3.2 15.4 1402 0 0 0 0
Latvia 295.5 13.6 164 0 1 0 0
Malta 11.3 5.4 1399 0 0 0 0
Slovak 25.7 41.1 573 0 1 0 0
Slove 16.8 32.2 762 0 1 0 0
Bots 0.33 8.7 5463 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.02 1.4 5037 0 0 0 1
Namib 0.01 5.5 5037 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.01 2.4 5587 0 0 0 0
USA 177 12000.2 4333 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Botswa SA 0.003 212.8 160 0 0 0 0
Aust 0.6 290.1 4635 1 0 0 0
Belg 20.4 349.8 5362 0 0 0 0
Bulg 0.03 24.1 4639 0 0 0 1
Czech 1.1 107 5193 1 0 0 1
Denm 1.32 243 5591 0 0 0 0
Eston 1 10.8 5790 1 0 0 0
Finl 0.4 186.6 5890 0 0 0 1
Fran 18.7 2000 5266 0 0 0 1
Germ 24.1 2700 5367 0 0 0 0
Swed 34.1 346.4 5805 0 0 0 0
Hung 1.4 99.7 4979 1 0 0 0
Irel 2.7 183.6 5712 0 0 0 0
Italy 10.9 1000.7 4875 0 0 0 0
Nether 6.6 577.3 5413 0 0 0 0
UK 209 2000.1 5476 0 0 0 0
Polan 0.4 241.8 5325 0 0 0 0
Egypt 1.23 75.1 3779 0 0 0 0
Keny 1.435 15.6 1765 0 0 0 0
Malaw 1.435 1.8 896 0 0 0 0
Mauriu 0.92 6.1 2048 0 0 0 0
Zamb 5.07 5.4 663 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 263.7 7.2 575 0 0 0 0
Gree 3.023 203.4 4314 1 0 0 0
Portu 2.01 168.3 4913 0 0 0 0
Spain 1.58 991.4 4879 1 0 0 1
Cyp 0.726 15.4 4142 1 0 0 0
Latvia 0.726 13.6 5620 0 0 0 0
Malta 0.662 5.4 4230 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.04 41.1 5041 0 0 0 0
Slove 0.06 32.2 4918 0 0 0 0
Lithu 0.05 22.3 5463 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.013 1.4 160 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.011 5.5 160 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.002 2.4 345 0 0 0 0
USA 66.2 12000.2 7801 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Lesotho SA 0 212.8 140 1 0 0 1
Aust 0.1 290.1 5166 0 0 0 0
Belg 44.1 349.8 5491 1 0 0 1
Bulg 0.08 24.1 4746 0 0 0 1
Czech 0.06 107 5310 0 0 0 0
Denm 0.09 243 5708 1 0 0 1
Eston 0.03 10.8 5894 0 0 0 0
Finl 0.02 186.6 5945 1 0 0 0
Fran 4.4 2000 5397 0 0 0 0
Germ 5.2 2700 5485 0 0 0 0
Swed 2.2 346.4 5916 0 0 0 0
Hung 1.23 99.7 5091 0 0 0 0
Irel 1.15 183.6 5848 1 0 0 1
Italy 1.1 1000.7 4779 0 0 0 0
Nether 1.5 577.3 5579 0 0 0 0
UK 8.1 2000.1 5609 0 0 0 0
Polan 24.4 241.8 5434 0 0 0 0
Egypt 0.007 75.1 3866 0 0 0 0
Keny 0.004 15.6 1809 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.004 1.8 919 0 0 0 0
Mauri 0.002 6.1 1930 0 0 0 0
Zamb 0.071 5.4 744 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 3.131 7.2 606 0 0 0 0
Gree 45.517 203.4 4421 0 0 0 0
Portu 23 168.3 5061 1 0 0 1
Spain 0.28 991.4 5010 0 0 0 0
Cyp 0.22 15.4 4229 1 0 0 1
Latvia 0.11 13.6 5725 1 0 0 0
Malta 0.1 5.4 5566 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.17 41.1 4353 0 0 0 0
Slove 0.13 32.2 5156 0 0 0 0
Lithu 0.1 22.3 5037 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.002 8.7 160 0 0 0 0
Namib 0.001 5.5 152 1 0 1 1
Swazi 0.001 2.4 201 0 1 0 0
USA 91.4 12000.2 7960 0 1 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Namib SA 0.02 212.8 152 0 0 0 0
Aus 1.4 290.1 5166 0 1 0 0
Belg 41.7 349.8 5491 0 0 0 0
Bulg 0.4 24.1 4746 0 0 0 0
Czech 0.2 107 5310 0 0 0 0
Denm 2.36 243 5708 0 0 0 0
Eston 1.23 10.8 5894 0 0 0 0
Finl 2.06 186.6 5945 0 0 0 0
Fran 26 2000 5397 0 1 0 0
Germ 45 2700 5485 1 0 1 0
Swed 1.6 346.4 5916 1 0 0 0
Hung 1.1 99.7 5091 0 0 0 0
Irel 0.6 183.6 5848 0 0 1 0
Italy 33.4 1000.7 4779 0 0 0 0
Nether 10.3 577.3 5579 0 1 0 0
UK 35.9 2000.1 5609 1 0 0 0
Polan 1074 241.8 5434 1 0 1 0
Egypt 0.041 75.1 3866 1 1 0 1
Keny 0.025 15.6 1809 1 0 0 0
Malaw 0.025 1.8 919 1 1 1 1
Maur 0.014 6.1 1930 1 1 1 1
Zamb 5.267 5.4 744 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 56.584 7.2 606 0 0 0 0
Gree 14.676 203.4 4421 0 0 0 0
Portu 2.14 168.3 5061 1 0 0 0
Spain 142 991.4 5010 0 0 0 0
Cyp 3 15.4 4229 0 0 1 0
Latvia 0.01 13.6 5725 0 1 0 0
Malta 0.01 5.4 5566 0 0 0 0
Slovak 0.21 41.1 4353 0 0 0 0
Slove 0.2 32.2 5156 1 1 1 1
Lithu 0.1 22.3 5037 0 0 0 1
Bots 0.03 1.4 160 1 1 1 1
Lesoth 0.02 5.5 140 0 0 0 0
Swazi 0.01 2.4 201 1 0 1 0
USA 90.9 12000.2 7960 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Swazil SA 0.02 212.8 201 0 0 0 0
Aus 0.3 290.1 5210 0 0 0 0
Belg 8.7 349.8 5558 0 1 0 0
Bulg 0 24.1 4775 0 0 0 0
Czech 0.04 107 5357 0 0 0 0
Denm 0.89 243 5754 0 0 0 0
Eston 0.13 10.8 5915 0 0 0 0
Finl 16.12 186.6 6052 0 0 0 0
Fran 45.6 2000 5471 0 0 0 0
Germ 6.9 2700 5532 0 1 0 0
Swed 3.4 346.4 5949 1 0 1 0
Hung 0.1 99.7 5129 1 0 0 0
Irel 1.71 183.6 6930 0 0 0 0
Italy 5.6 1000.7 4838 0 0 0 0
Nether 4.3 577.3 5609 0 0 0 0
UK 48.2 2000.1 5684 0 1 0 0
Polan 1231 241.8 5465 1 0 0 0
Egypt 0.06 75.1 3872 1 0 1 0
Keny 0.2 15.6 1762 1 1 0 0
Malaw 0.2 1.8 866 1 0 0 0
Mauri 0.15 6.1 1732 1 1 1 0
Zamb 7.614 5.4 775 1 1 1 1
Zimbab 25.029 7.2 584 0 0 0 0
Gree 4.3 203.4 4452 0 0 0 0
Portu 3.03 168.3 5174 0 0 0 0
Spain 0.018 991.4 5110 1 0 0 0
Cyp 0.018 15.4 4230 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0.01 13.6 5748 1 0 1 0
Malta 0.01 5.4 4413 0 1 0 0
Slovak 1.1 41.1 5198 0 0 0 0
Slove 1.2 32.2 5088 0 0 0 0
Lithu 1.13 22.3 5587 1 1 1 1
Bots 0.04 8.7 345 0 0 1 1
Lesoth 0.03 1.4 201 1 1 1 1
Namibia 0.01 5.5 201 1 0 1 1
USA 52.4 12000.2 8133 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
USA SA 5616 212.8 7960 0 0 0 0
Aus 4526 290.1 4233 0 0 0 0
Belg 22515 349.8 3668 0 1 0 0
Bulg 289 24.1 4724 0 0 0 0
Czech 1230 107 4094 0 0 0 0
Denm 3983 243 3850 0 0 0 0
Eston 134 10.8 4145 0 0 0 0
Finl 4269 186.6 4123 0 0 0 0
Fran 37331 2000 3635 0 0 0 0
Germ 68660 2700 4042 0 1 0 0
Swed 10847 346.4 3934 1 0 1 0
Hung 1594 99.7 4376 1 0 0 0
Irel 10600 183.6 3185 0 0 0 0
Italy 29166 1000.7 4298 0 0 0 0
Nether 27505 577.3 3652 0 0 0 0
UK 69991 2000.1 3470 1 1 1 0
Polan 1915 241.8 4261 1 0 0 0
Egypt 4535 75.1 5621 0 0 1 0
Keny 346 15.6 7360 0 1 0 0
Malaw 105.6 1.8 7769 0 0 0 0
Mauri 285 6.1 9288 0 1 1 0
Zamb 86.5 5.4 7546 0 1 1 0
Zimbab 230 7.2 7788 0 0 0 0
Gree 1552 203.4 5289 0 0 0 0
Portu 2149 168.3 4266 0 0 0 0
Spain 10455 991.4 3591 1 0 0 0
Cyp 261 15.4 5468 0 0 0 0
Latvia 382 13.6 4210 1 0 1 0
Malta 346 5.4 4626 0 1 0 0
Slovak 258 41.1 4233 0 0 0 0
Slove 402 32.2 3591 0 0 0 0
Lithu 177 22.3 4333 1 1 0 0
Bots 68.2 8.7 7801 0 0 0 0
Lesoth 91.4 1.4 7960 0 0 0 0
Namibia 90.9 5.5 7960 0 0 0 0
Swazi 52.4 2.4 8133 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Ire SA 396 212.8 5848 0 0 0 0
Austria 285 290.1 1048 0 0 0 0
Belg 3040 349.8 484 1 0 0 0
Bulg 8 24.1 1541 0 0 0 0
Czech 178 107 914 1 1 0 1
Denm 852 243 765 1 0 0 1
Eston 554 10.8 1245 1 0 0 0
Finl 325 186.6 783 0 1 0 0
Fran 1808 2000 489 0 1 0 0
Germ 2311 2700 817 0 0 0 0
Swed 1203 346.4 1010 0 1 0 0
Hunga 188 99.7 1192 1 0 0 0
Italy 2428 1000.7 1182 1 0 0 0
Nether 4879 577.3 448 0 0 0 0
UK 25774 2000.1 291 0 0 0 0
Poland 291 241.8 1135 0 0 0 0
Egypt 153.28 75.1 2478 0 0 0 0
Keny 35 15.6 4507 0 0 0 0
Malaw 0.66 1.8 5211 0 0 0 0
Mauri 16.79 6.1 6346 0 0 0 0
Zamb 4 5.4 5163 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 15.77 7.2 5385 0 0 0 0
Gree 5907 203.4 1777 0 0 0 0
Portu 325 168.3 1026 0 0 0 0
Spain 1740 991.4 848 0 0 0 0
Cyp 50 15.4 2288 0 0 0 0
Latvia 27 13.6 1215 1 0 1 1
Malta 35 5.4 1574 0 0 0 0
Slovak 30 41.1 1081 0 0 0 0
Slove 26 32.2 1055 0 0 0 0
Lithu 19 22.3 1276 1 0 1 0
Bots 2.71 8.7 5712 1 0 0 0
Lesot 1.12 1.4 5609 1 0 0 0
Namib 0.6 5.5 5609 1 0 1 0
Swazi 1.71 2.4 5930 1 0 1 0
USA 10600 12000.2 3185 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Finl SA 248 212.8 5387 1 0 0 0
Austria 690 290.1 645 1 0 0 1
Belg 1685 349.8 675 0 0 0 0
Bulg 36 24.1 1305 0 0 0 0
Czech 378 107 697 0 0 0 0
Denm 2229 243 299 0 0 0 0
Eston 1646 10.8 493 0 0 0 0
Fran 3089 2000 836 0 0 0 0
Germ 8651 2700 523 0 0 0 0
Swed 7404 346.4 259 0 0 0 0
Hung 276 99.7 931 0 0 0 0
Irel 550 183.6 783 0 0 0 0
Italy 2379 1000.7 694 0 0 0 0
Nether 2798 577.3 638 0 0 0 1
UK 6151 2000.1 718 0 0 0 0
Poland 1020 241.8 648 0 0 0 0
Egypt 183 75.1 2279 0 0 0 1
Keny 44 15.6 4447 0 0 0 0
Malaw 5.31 1.8 5252 0 0 0 0
Mauri 9.16 6.1 6133 0 0 0 0
Zamb 14 5.4 5278 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 13 7.2 5477 0 0 0 0
Gree 309 203.4 1619 0 0 0 0
Portu 437 168.3 1703 0 0 0 0
Spain 1282 991.4 1358 0 0 0 0
Cyp 18 15.4 1990 0 0 0 0
Latvia 295 13.6 528 0 0 0 0
Malta 6 5.4 1671 0 0 0 0
Slovak 99 41.1 855 0 0 0 0
Slove 55 32.2 973 0 0 0 0
Lithu 185 22.3 655 0 0 0 0
Bots 0.4 8.7 5890 0 0 0 0
Lesot 0.02 1.4 5387 0 0 0 0
Namib 2.06 5.5 5387 0 0 0 0
Swazi 16.12 2.4 6052 0 0 0 1
USA 4269 12000.2 4123 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Fran SA 1672 212.8 5091 0 0 0 0
Aus 4985 290.1 645 0 0 0 0
Belg 43199 349.8 165 0 0 0 1
Bulg 349 24.1 1095 0 0 0 0
czech 1866 107 551 0 0 0 0
Denm 4617 243 639 0 0 0 0
Eston 105 10.8 1158 0 0 0 0
Finland 1653 186.6 836 0 0 0 0
Germ 87472 2700 545 0 0 0 0
Swed 7857 346.4 963 0 0 0 1
Hung 1758 99.7 787 0 0 1 1
Irel 5687 183.6 489 0 0 0 0
Italy 51120 1000.7 694 0 0 0 1
Nether 26040 577.3 198 0 0 0 1
UK 49955 2000.1 213 0 0 0 0
Poland 3558 241.8 859 0 0 0 0
Egypt 1653 75.1 2001 0 0 0 1
Keny 198.6 15.6 4020 0 0 0 0
Malaw 13.8 1.8 4734 0 0 0 0
Mauri 701 6.1 5859 0 0 0 0
Zamb 95.3 5.4 4699 0 0 0 0
Zimbab 94.7 7.2 4918 0 0 0 1
Gree 2824 203.4 1301 0 0 0 0
Portu 6845 168.3 902 0 0 0 1
Spain 39757 991.4 523 0 0 0 1
Cyp 182 15.4 1834 0 0 0 0
Latvia 132 13.6 1062 0 0 0 0
Malta 631 5.4 1088 0 0 0 0
Slovak 618 41.1 679 0 0 0 0
Slove 1562 32.2 602 0 0 0 0
Lithu 291 22.3 1059 0 0 0 0
Bots 18.7 8.7 5265 0 0 0 0
Lesot 4.4 1.4 5091 0 0 0 0
Namib 26 5.5 5091 0 0 0 0
Swazi 45.6 2.4 5471 0 0 0 0
USA 37331 12000.2 3635 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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from to Xij gdp dist history landlocked language borders
Germ SA 4435 212.8 5848 0 0 0 0
Aus 42515 290.1 326 0 0 0 0
Belg 56634 349.8 403 0 0 0 1
Bulg 1170 24.1 821 0 0 0 0
Czech 17465 107 175 0 0 0 0
Denmark 17008 243 224 0 0 0 0
Estonia 641 10.8 650 0 0 0 1
Finla 8825 186.6 523 0 0 0 1
Fran 100299 2000 545 0 0 0 1
Swed 20167 346.4 508 0 0 0 0
Hung 12959 99.7 439 0 0 1 1
Irel 7237 183.6 817 0 0 1 1
Italy 71754 1000.7 736 0 0 0 0
Nether 72784 577.3 408 1 0 0 1
UK 73594 2000.1 577 0 0 0 0
Poland 20184 241.8 327 1 0 0 0
Egypt 2156 75.1 1802 0 0 0 0
Keny 342 15.6 3949 0 0 0 1
Malaw 88.3 1.8 4738 0 0 0 0
Mauri 180.6 6.1 5685 1 0 0 1
Zamb 41 5.4 4758 0 0 0 1
Zimbab 270 7.2 4958 0 0 0 1
Gree 5351 203.4 1119 0 0 0 1
Portu 10477 168.3 1435 0 0 0 0
Spain 33802 991.4 1007 1 0 0 1
Cyp 384 15.4 1549 0 0 0 1
Latvia 891 13.6 528 0 0 0 0
Malta 462 5.4 1151 0 0 0 0
Slovak 5046 41.1 345 0 0 0 0
Slove 4435 32.2 450 0 0 0 0
Lithu 1474 22.3 514 0 0 0 0
Bots 24.1 8.7 5367 0 0 0 0
Lesot 5.2 1.4 5848 0 0 0 0
Namib 45 5.5 5848 0 0 0 0
Swazi 6.9 2.4 5532 0 0 0 1
USA 68660 12000.2 4042 0 0 0 0
interact 0 0 0 0  
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